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Racially Based Jury Nullification:
Black Power in the Criminal Justice System
Paul Butlert
Wonders do not confuse. We call them that
And close the matter there. But common things
surprise us. They accept the names we give
with calm, and keep them. Easy-breathing then
We brave our next small business. Well, behind
Our backs they alter. How were we to know.'
Gwendolyn Brooks
[T]he time that we're living in now... is not an era where one who
is oppressed is looking toward the oppressor to give him some system
or form of logic or reason. What is logical to the oppressor isn't
logical to the oppressed. And what is reason to the oppressor isn't
reason to the oppressed. The black people in this country are
beginning to realize that what sounds reasonable to those who exploit
us doesn't sound reasonable to us. There just has to be a new system
of reason and logic devised by us who are at the bottom, if we want
to get some results in this struggle that is called "the Negro
revolution."2
Malcolm X
t Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. This Essay was supported
by a research grant from Dean Jack Friedenthal of George Washington University Law School. It was
presented as a work-in-progress at the Mid-Atlantic People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference and
before the junior faculty at George Washington. In addition to the participants in those meetings, the author
thanks Burlette Carter, Robert Cottrol, Jayne Jerkins, Steven Kim, William Rubenstein, Katheryn Russell,
Mark Srere, Carol Steiker, and Robert Tuttle. This Essay is dedicated to Legertha Butler Walton, the
author's mother. She is the reason that he is a law professor, hoping to salvage the lives of some desperate
people, and not one of those desperate people.
I. GWENDOLYN BROOKS, The Artists' and Models' Ball, in THE BEAN EATERS 67, 67 (1960).
2. Malcolm X, Speech at the Leverett House Forum of March 18, 1964, in THE SPEECHES OF
MALCOLM X AT HARVARD 131, 133 (Archie Epps ed., 1968).
677
The Yale Law Journal
INTRODUCTION
I was a Special Assistant United States Attorney in the District of
Columbia in 1990. I prosecuted people accused of misdemeanor crimes, mainly
the drug and gun cases that overwhelm the local courts of most American
cities.3 As a federal prosecutor, I represented the United States of America and
used that power to put people, mainly African-American men, in prison. I am
also an African-American man. While at the U.S. Attorney's office, I made
two discoveries that profoundly changed the way I viewed my work as a
prosecutor and my responsibilities as a black person.
The first discovery occurred during a training session for new Assistants
conducted by experienced prosecutors. We rookies were informed that we
would lose many of our cases, despite having persuaded a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty. We would lose because some
black jurors would refuse to convict black defendants who they knew were
guilty.
The second discovery was related to the first, but was even more
unsettling. It occurred during the trial of Marion Barry, then the second-term
mayor of the District of Columbia. Barry was being prosecuted by my office
for drug possession and perjury. I learned, to my surprise, that some of my
fellow African-American prosecutors hoped that the mayor would be acquitted,
despite the fact that he was obviously guilty of at least one of the charges-he
had smoked cocaine on FBI videotape.4 These black prosecutors wanted their
office to lose its case because they believed that the prosecution of Barry was
racist.
Federal prosecutors in the nation's capital hear many rumors about
prominent officials engaging in illegal conduct, including drug use. Some
African-American prosecutors wondered why, of all those people, the
government chose to "set up" the most famous black politician in Washington,
D.C.5 They also asked themselves why, if crack is so dangerous, the FBI had
allowed the mayor to smoke it. Some members of the predominantly black jury
must have had similar concerns: They convicted the mayor of only one count
of a fourteen-count indictment, despite the trial judge's assessment that he had
"'never seen a stronger government case.' 6 Some African-American
prosecutors thought that the jury, in rendering its verdict, jabbed its black
3. See Joseph Calve, On Golden Hill; A "Typical" Day in Urban G.A., CONN. L. TRIB., Oct. 24, 1994,
at 1; Michael D. Hinds, Administration Pushes Gun-Related Cases on Federal Courts, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., May 17, 1991, at 3.
4. See George Hackett & Bob Cohn, Mayor Barry: Lurid Tales of the Tape, NEWVSWEEK, July 9, 1990,
at 25.
5. See infra Section L.A for a description of the investigation and prosecution of Barry.
6. Christopher B. Daly, Barry Judge Castigates Four Jurors; Evidence of Guilt was "Overihelming,"
Jackson Tells Forum, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1990, at Al (quoting U.S. District Judge Thomas Penfield
Jackson). The trial judge's comments were made after the verdict.
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thumb in the face of a racist prosecution, and that idea made those prosecutors
glad.
As such reactions suggest, lawyers and judges-increasingly perceive that
some African-American jurors vote to acquit black defendants for racial
reasons,7 a decision sometimes expressed as the juror's desire not to send yet
another black man to jail.8 This Essay examines the question of what role race
should play in black jurors' decisions to acquit defendants in criminal cases.
Specifically, I consider trials that include both African-American defendants
and African-American jurors. I argue that the race of a black defendant is
sometimes a legally and morally appropriate factor for jurors to consider in
reaching a verdict of not guilty or for an individual juror to consider in
refusing to vote for conviction.9
My thesis is that, for pragmatic and political reasons, the black community
is better off when some nonviolent lawbreakers remain in the community
rather than go to prison. The decision as to what kind of conduct by African-
Americans ought to be punished is better made by African-Americans
themselves, based on the costs and benefits to their community, than by the
traditional criminal justice process, which is controlled by white lawmakers
and white law enforcers. Legally, the doctrine of jury nullification gives the
power to make this decision to African-American jurors who sit in judgment
of African-American defendants. Considering the costs of law enforcement to
the black community and the failure of white lawmakers to devise significant
nonincarcerative responses to black antisocial conduct, it is the moral
responsibility of black jurors to emancipate some guilty black outlaws.
Part I of this Essay describes two criminal cases in the District of
Columbia in which judges feared that defendants or their lawyers were sending
race-conscious, "forbidden" messages to black jurors and attempted to regulate
those messages. I suggest that the judicial and public responses to those cases
signal a dangerous reluctance among many Americans to engage in meaningful
discourse about the relationship between race and crime. In Part II, I describe
racial critiques of the criminal justice system. I then examine the evolution of
7. Cf. Mark Curriden, Blowing Smoke, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1995, at 56, 59 ("As in the Simpson case, race
has become the most popular way of setting an underlying tone to grab the sympathy of black jurors and
possibly the guilt of white jurors, say judges and lawyers.").
8. See, e.g., Barton Gellman & Sari Horwitz, Letter Stirs Debate After Acquittal; Writer Says Jurors
Bowed to Racial Issue in D.C. Murder Case, WASH. PosT, Apr. 22, 1990, at Al (quoting letter to court
from anonymous juror following acquittal in murder case saying that "most of the jury believed [the
defendant] was guilty, but bowed to holdouts who 'didn't want to send anymore Young Black Men to
Jail"'). But cf. Dan Snodderly, WIhen 12 Strangers Came Together, WASH. POST, May 10, 1994, at A16
(reporting experience of letter-to-editor writer on jury where several jurors held "concern that so many
young black men were in prison and that the judicial system did not seem fair to young blacks ... but no
one argued for acquittal on that basis").
9. An acquittal on this basis would be jury nullification. Although most American jurisdictions require
a unanimous verdict, and a single juror's vote for acquittal would not itself free the defendant, such a vote
would prevent conviction. The prosecution would then have the option of either retrying the case or
dismissing it.
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the doctrine of jury nullification and suggest, in light of this doctrine, that
racial considerations by African-American jurors are legally and morally right.
Part Ill proposes a framework for analysis of the kind of criminal cases
involving black defendants in which jury nullification is appropriate, and
considers some of the concerns that implementation of the proposal raises.
My goal is the subversion of American criminal justice, at least as it now
exists. Through jury nullification, I want to dismantle the master's house with
the master's tools.'0 My intent, however, is not purely destructive; this project
is also constructive, because I hope that the destruction of the status quo will
not lead to anarchy, but rather to the implementation of certain noncriminal
ways of addressing antisocial conduct. Criminal conduct among African-
Americans is often a predictable reaction to oppression. Sometimes black crime
is a symptom of internalized white supremacy; other times it is a reasonable
response to the racial and economic subordination every African-American
faces every day. Punishing black people for the fruits of racism is wrong if
that punishment is premised on the idea that it is the black criminal's "just
deserts." Hence, the new paradigm of justice that I suggest in Part III rejects
punishment for the sake of retribution and endorses it, with qualifications, for
the ends of deterrence and incapacitation.
In a sense, this Essay simply may argue for the return of rehabilitation as
the purpose of American criminal justice, but a rehabilitation that begins with
the white-supremacist beliefs that poison the minds of us all-you, me, and the
black criminal. I wish that black people had the power to end racial oppression
right now. African-Americans can prevent the application of one particularly
destructive instrument of white supremacy-American criminal justice-to
some African-American people, and this they can do immediately. I hope that
this Essay makes the case for why and how they should."
10. I borrow-and corrupt-this phrase from AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER 110 (1984). My use
is a corruption because Lorde states that the master's tools can "never" dismantle the master's house. I
explain my belief that the thoughtful use of jury nullification is morally right for African-Americans below
in Section II.C.
11. Both historically and recently, jury nullification has been associated with individuals and groups
that have objectives quite contrary to mine, which are black self-help and self-determination. See, e.g.,
Wade Lambert, More Angry Men: Militias Are Joining Jury-Power Activists to Fight Government; Tax
Protesters, Survivalists Benefit from Message: Juries Can Ignore Law; "Red" Beckman's Revenge, WALL
ST. J., May 25, 1995, at Al (describing advocacy of jury nullification by members of extremist groups that
support militia and white-supremacist movements). Although some of these right-wing advocates and I
share a dissatisfaction with American democracy as an effective protector of the rights of unpopular
minorities, I do not think that the use of jury nullification by these groups has the same moral legitimacy
as its use by African-Americans. I make the moral case for African-Americans based on the racial bias of
the criminal justice system infra Section II.C. Legally, however, nullification is as much the prerogative
of white supremacists as of other jurors, including African-Americans. The fact that some would use
nullification to undermine justice for African-Americans is hardly a reason, as some might argue, for blacks
not to use nullification to advance justice.
Perhaps the fallacy of that argument can best be appreciated by examining it in the related context
of electoral politics. Many white people use their votes at the ballot box to achieve the same goal as right-
wing advocates of jury nullification: black subordination. That fact is not usually offered as evidence that
African-Americans should not exercise their legal right to vote, and to vote in their own interests. The way
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I. SECRET MESSAGES EVERYONE HEARS
Americans seem reluctant to have an open conversation about the
relationship between race and crime. Lawmakers ignore the issue, judges run
from it, and crafty defense lawyers exploit it. It is not surprising, then, that
some African-American jurors are forced to sneak through the back door what
is not allowed to come in through the front: the idea that "race matters" in
criminal justice.' 2 In this part, I tell two stories about attempts by defense
attorneys to encourage black jurors' sympathy for their clients, and then I
examine how these attempts provoked many people to act as though the idea
of racial identification with black defendants was ridiculous or insulting to
black people. In fact, the defense attorneys may well have been attempting to
encourage black jurors' sympathy as part of their trial strategies. The lesson
of the stories is that the failure of the law to address openly the relationship
between race and crime fosters a willful and unhelpful blindness in many who
really ought to see and allows jury nullification to go on without a principled
framework. This Essay offers such a framework and encourages nullification
for the purpose of black self-help.
A. United States v. Marion Barry
The time is January 1990. The mayor of the District of Columbia is an
African-American man named Marion Barry. African-Americans make up
approximately sixty-six percent of the population of the city. 3 The mayor is
so popular in the black community that one local newspaper columnist has
dubbed him "Mayor for Life."'14 Barry is hounded, however, by rumors of his
that some white people choose to exercise their power to vote-at the ballot box or in the jury box-is
irrelevant to how black people should exercise that same power. Indeed, some commentators have noted
a disturbing double standard in the analysis of the appropriateness of nullification, depending upon which
group is engaging in it. See, e.g., Curriden, supra note 7, at 59 ("'Nobody cared... [when] for 200 years,
white people got off on criminal charges [in violent crimes against blacks by] raising the issue of race and
seeking jury nullification. These people only started caring when black people started doing the same thing
to get off."' (quoting New York City lawyer and political activist Ronald Kuby)). While I think that Kuby
overstates the case-many liberals did care about jury nullification by Southern whites in cases of violent
crimes against blacks-I am also concerned about the racial implications of recent critiques of jury
nullification.
12. The phrase is taken from CORNELL WEST, RACE MATrERS (1993). Lani Guinier has expressed the
view that blacks and whites are unable to engage in open discussion with each other about race. See Dale
Russakoff, Lani Guinier Is Still Alive and Talking, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1993, Magazine, at W14, W16,
W32.
13. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS & STATISTICS ADMIN., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1994, at 46 (1994) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
1994].
14. See Jefferson Morley, Jack the Ripper; Haunted by Respectability, the City Paper Editor Skips
Town, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1995, at C5.
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using drugs and "'chasing women." ' 15 Barry denies the rumors and claims
that they are racist.'
6
On January 18, 1990, the mayor is contacted by an old friend, Rasheeda
Moore, who tells him that she is visiting for a short time, and staying at a
local hotel.' 7 The mayor stops by later that afternoon and telephones Ms.
Moore's room from the lobby of the hotel. He wants her to come downstairs
to the lobby for a drink, but she requests that he come up to her room. The
mayor assents, joins Ms. Moore in the room, and the two converse. At some
point, Ms. Moore produces crack cocaine and a pipe, and invites the mayor to
smoke it. He first demurs, then consents, and after he inhales smoke from the
pipe, agents of the FBI and the Metropolitan Police Department storm the
room. It turns out that Ms. Moore is a government informant, and the police
have observed and videotaped the entire proceeding in the hotel room. The
mayor is arrested and subsequently charged with one count of conspiracy to
possess cocaine, ten counts of possession of cocaine, and three counts of
perjury for allegedly lying to the grand jury that had investigated him. 8 The
mayor publicly asserts that he is the victim of a racist prosecution.' 9
It is the last week in June 1990. The mayor is on trial in federal court.20
The judge is white. Of the twelve jurors, ten are African-American. 2'
Rasheeda Moore, the government's star witness, is expected to testify. The
mayor has four passes to give to guests he would like to attend his trial. On
this day, he has given one pass to Minister Louis Farrakhan, the controversial
leader of the Nation of Islam. Farrakhan has publicly supported Barry since his
arrest, in part by suggesting that the sting operation and the prosecution were
racist.22 When Farrakhan attempts to walk into the courtroom, a U.S. deputy
marshal bars his entry. When Barry's attorney protests, the judge states,
outside of the jury's hearing, that Farrakhan's "'presence would be potentially
15. See Bella Stumbo, Mayor Barry: Keeping D.C. Guessing, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1990, at AI, A20.
16. See id.
17. The following account is drawn from Michael York, Excerpts from Videotape of Barry's Arrest
at the Vista Hotel, WASH. POST, June 29, 1990, at A22.
18. See United States v. Barry, 938 F.2d 1327, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Because the District of
Columbia is a federal "territory," see D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-101 (1995), most crimes are prosecuted by the
United States Attorney, who, at the time of the Barry prosecution, and like every District of Columbia chief
prosecutor before him, was white, cf Jim Clardy, New Faces Approach Federal Bench, WASH. TIMES, Oct.
4, 1993, at C4 (reporting appointment of first black U.S. Attorney for Washington, D.C.).
19. See Mary McGrory, Barry Putting His Trial on Trial, WASH. POST, July 3, 1990, at A2. Barry's
lawyer made a similar claim in describing the defense strategy. See Michael Hedges, Mundy to Stress "Get-
Barry" Zeal, WASH. TIMES, July 4, 1990, at Al.
20. The trial decision can be found at United States v. Barry, No. 90-0068, 1990 WL 174907 (D.D.C.
Oct. 26, 1990), aff'd, 938 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
21. See Steve Twomey & DeNeen L. Brown, Barry Guilty on I Count, Cleared on 1; Mistrial
Declared on 12 Other Charges; Panel Split 6 to 6 On Vista Charge, One Juror Says, WASH. POST, Aug.
11, 1990, at Al, A13.
22. See Nathan McCall, Farrakhan Barred from Barry Trial; Muslim Leader "Persona Non Grata,"
Judge Says, WASH. POST, June 29, 1990, at Cl, C4.
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disruptive, very likely intimidating, and he is a persona non grata for the [rest]
of this case."' 3 Rasheeda Moore then takes the stand.
The next day, the Reverend George Stallings appears at the trial with one
of Barry's guest passes in hand. Stallings is a black Roman Catholic priest
who, the previous year, received extensive publicity when he accused the
Catholic Church of being hopelessly racist, left it, and founded his own
church.24 When Stallings reaches the courtroom, the deputy marshal,
following the instructions of the judge, does not let him enter. The judge
explains, again outside of the jury's hearing, that Stallings is "'in my
judgment, not an ordinary member of the public and his presence would very
likely have the same effect as Mr. Farrakhan's."' ' The judge also indicates
that there are "'others who fit the same category.' ' 26 Barry's attorney asks for
a list of those persons. The judge replies, "'I think you will know them when
you see them."' 27
In the wake of these two episodes, the American Civil Liberties Union,
representing Barry, Farrakhan, and Stallings, files an emergency appeal of the
trial judge's decision. It argues that the judge's refusal to allow Barry's guests
to attend the trial violated Barry's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and
the First Amendment rights of the guests.28 In response, the judge's attorneys
state that the judge excluded Farrakhan and Stallings because their presence in
the courtroom would send an "'impermissible message"' of "'intimidation"'
and "'racial animosity"' to jurors and witnesses.2 9 The judge's attorneys argue
that the excluded persons' views of the prosecution had been highly publicized
and that their appearance at the trial was consistent with Barry's "'publicly
avowed strategies of seeking a hung jury and jury nullification."'30 The
judge's attorneys argue that Farrakhan and Stallings attended the trial "'not to
view the proceedings or to show generalized concern, but instead to send a
forbidden message to the jury and witness.''
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rules that
Farrakhan and Stallings should have presented their constitutional claims to the
trial judge prior to seeking relief in the appellate court.32 Accordingly, it
remands the case back to the trial judge. Because the trial has been halted
23. Saundra Tarry, Stallings Excluded From Barry Trial; ACLU to Appeal Judge's Actions Barring
Bishop, Farrakhan, WASH. POST. June 30, 1990, at A13.
24. See Lyndsay Griffiths, Judge Bars Two Blacks from Barry Trial, Opening New Legal Case,
Reuters, July 3, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File; Saundra Torry, Judge Ordered to
Defend Barring Farrakhan, Stallings From Trial, WASH. POST, July 3, 1990, at A12.
25. Tarry, supra note 23, at A13.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Tarry, supra note 24, at A12.
29. Saundra Torry, Court Hears Defense of Judge's Bans, WASH. POST, July 4, 1990, at Al, A12.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. United States v. Barry, Nos. 90-3150, 90-3149, & 90-3151, 1990 WL 104925 (D.C. Cir. July 5,
1990).
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pending appeal, however, the D.C. Circuit, in light of the "exigent
circumstances," lists several "pertinent considerations" for the trial judge on
remand.33 The considerations mainly concern the judge's power to regulate
the attendance of those who threaten physically to disrupt a courtroom. 34 The
court does note, though, that:
No individual can be wholly excluded from the courtroom merely
because he advocates a particular political, legal or religious point of
view--even a point of view that the district court or we may regard
as antithetical to the fair administration of justice. Nor can an
individual be wholly excluded from the courtroom because his
presence is thought to send an undesirable message to the jurors
except that of physical intimidation."
The trial judge hears the message of the court of appeals. In lieu of
resolving Farrakhan and Stallings's constitutional claims, he instead seeks
assurances from their attorneys that their clients know how to conduct
themselves in a courtroom. 36 Indeed, the judge provides the attorneys with his
own "special rules" of decorum regarding the trial, stating that "any attempt
to communicate with a juror may be punished as criminal contempt of
court."' 37 Farrakhan and Stallings's attorneys assure the court that their clients
will act with decorum in the courtroom. 38 The trial continues. The mayor is
eventually convicted of one of the indictment's fourteen counts (for perjury),
but not of the count in which he smoked the cocaine on videotape.39
B. The Attorney Who Wore Kente Cloth
It is now June 11, 1992. John T. Harvey, III is an African-American
criminal defense attorney who practices in the District of Columbia. Harvey
represents a black man who is charged with assault with intent to murder. The
33. Id. at *1.
34. The pertinent considerations are as follows:
First, the district court has discretion in governing proceedings within the courtroom to prevent
both physical intimidation of participants and disruption of the trial.... Second, the district
court may exercise its discretion to protect particular witnesses from intimidation or harassment
while testifying .... Third, there is no doubt that the district court may exclude an individual
who causes a disturbance in the courtroom....
Fourth, the district court's discretion must te exercised consistently with the First and
Fifth Amendment rights of individuals to attend criminal trials.... Fifth, in the event someone
who poses a threat of physical intimidation to the jurors appears and is excluded, the court need
not stop the trial.
Id. at *1-2.
35. Id. at *2.
36. See Saundra Torry, Judge Reverses Ban on Attendance; Stallings Joins Spectators, WASH. POST,
July 7, 1990, at Al, AS.
37. Id.
38. Id. at Al.
39. See "Ivomey & Brown, supra note 21, at Al, A13.
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case is scheduled for arraignment before a white judge. At the arraignment,
Harvey wears a business suit and tie, and his jacket is accessorized by a
colorful stole made of kente cloth. Kente cloth is a mutltihued woven fabric
originally worn by ancient African royalty, and many African-Americans have
adopted it as a fashion statement and a symbol of racial pride.4"
In pretrial proceedings, the judge had warned Harvey that he would not be
permitted to wear kente cloth before a jury. According to Harvey, the judge
told him that wearing the fabric during a jury trial "'was sending a hidden
message to jurors."' The judge had informed Harvey that he had three
options: He could refrain from wearing the kente cloth; he could withdraw
from the case; or he could agree to try the case before the judge, without a
jury.42 Harvey's client decided to plead guilty. At the June 11 hearing,
however, Harvey refuses to enter his client's plea before the judge because he
doubts that the judge will be impartial. The judge then removes Harvey from
the case, "'not on the basis of [the] kente cloth, but on the basis that [Harvey]
will not enter a plea which [his] client wishes to enter."' 43
The same day, another client of Harvey's is scheduled to go to trial, also
for assault with intent to kill, before another white judge. During the voir dire,
the judge asks if any of the jurors are familiar with Harvey, whose battle with
the other judge was well publicized. Four of the potential jurors know of the
controversy. "'[T]he concern we think we have here,"' the judge says, is "'that
we won't influence a juror improperly.' 44 He also informs them of case law
in another jurisdiction suggesting that a court may prevent a Catholic priest
from wearing a clerical collar in court.45 When Harvey asks the judge to
inform the potential jurors of contrary cases, the judge refuses. The judge
subsequently states:
"For the record, Mr. Harvey is black. Aside from the courtroom
clerk, he is the only black person who is participating in this trial....
He is wearing a so-called kente cloth around his neck, and he has
recently received wide publicity, which I am sure he loves.
"I have wondered with my own conscience whether for me to
simply wait for the government or someone else to object is the
40. See Sabra Chartrand, A Dispute Over Courtroom Attire, and Principles, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
1992, at B8; Charles Elder, African Clothes Attract Attention at Galleries; Kente-Cloth Garments Becoming
Big Sellers, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1989, at F7.
41. Black D.C. Atty Is At Odds Wth Judge Over Kente Cloth, JET, June 22, 1992, at 35.
42. Andrew Brownstein, Showdown Over Kente Cloth; D.C. Judge Takes Resolute Lawyer Off Case,
WASH. POST, June 12, 1992, at Al, AI8.
43. Id. (quoting Judge Robert M. Scott).
44. John Murawski, Colorful Cloth Has Judges Seeing Red, LEGAL TIMES, July 6, 1992, at 6, 6. The
defendant in this case was Lebanese. See id. The judge did not express more specifically his concern that
the cloth would prejudice black jurors, but it is possible that he thought it would make the jurors more
sympathetic to either the nonwhite defendant or the African-American defense attorney. Harvey claimed
that he wore the kente cloth for religious and cultural reasons. See id.
45. Id.; see La Rocca v. Lane, 338 N.E.2d 606 (N.Y. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968 (1976).
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proper approach to avoid a war with Mr. Harvey, which I am not
anxious for-either personally or on behalf of the Superior Court....
I also note that this is costing us all a lot of time... and I don't
appreciate it.",
46
Ultimately, the judge allows Harvey to wear the cloth, but he suggests that
when Harvey submits an attorney fee voucher to him for approval, he might
not allow Harvey to be paid for the time the kente cloth issue has
consumed.47 Harvey's client is tried before an all-black jury and is
acquitted.48
C. The Judicial and Popular Response: Willful Blindness
As described above, the trial judge's attempt to exclude Farrakhan and
Stallings from Barry's trial met with disapproval from the D.C. Circuit. In the
case of John Harvey, no higher court had occasion to review the judge's
prohibition against the kente cloth,49 but, as discussed below, much of the
public reaction to the judge's prohibition was critical.5° These responses
scorned the trial judge's fears that black jurors might acquit on the basis of
racial identification rather than the "evidence." The D.C. Circuit and many
observers, however, failed to acknowledge the significance of the "forbidden"
message. I believe that this failure was deliberate. It reflected an intention to
avoid serious consideration of the issue of black jurors acquitting black
defendants on the basis of racial identification. Simply put, the D.C. Circuit
and some of the public did not want to face the reality that race matters, in
general and in jury adjudications of guilt and innocence.
1. The D.C. Circuit: We Hate Fights
The D.C. Circuit's per curiam opinion discussed the issue before it as
though the judge's concern was that Barry's invitees would cause some type
of physical disruption. The court listed a series of five "pertinent
considerations,"5' four of which actually were not pertinent because they
involved the physical disruption of courtrooms or physical threats to witnesses.
46. Murawski, supra note 44, at 6.
47. Id. Under the District's Criminal Justice Act, an attorney assigned to a case must submit a "sworn
written statement" for his or her attorney fees. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-2604 (1981).
48. Murawski, supra note 44, at 6.
49. Harvey sued the judge who removed him from the case for violating his First Amendment rights,
see Lawyer's African Cloth of Faith Barred by Judge, Cmt. TRIB., June 12, 1992, § 1, at 3, but the judge
died before the case was resolved, see D.C. Superior Court Judge Robert M. Scott Dies at 70, WASH. POST,
Sept. 17. 1992, at D5.
50. See, e.g., Donna Britt, Kente Cloth's Wiles Have Yet to Unfold, WASH. POST, May 26, 1992, at
BI; Judging the Kente Cloth, WASH. POST, June 13, 1992, at A20.
51. United States v. Barry, Nos. 90-3150, 90-3149, & 90-3151, 1990 WL 104925, at *1-2 (D.C. Cir.
July 5. 1990).
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The only relevant consideration was so vague that it was nearly useless: The
trial judge must exercise his discretion to exclude people from attending
criminal matters "consistently with the First and Fifth Amendment rights of
individuals to attend criminal trials."52 The court's discussion of this
consideration is even more ambivalent: No one can be "wholly" excluded from
a trial, even if he advocates a point of view that "we may regard as antithetical
to the fair administration of justice" or if his presence sends an "undesirable
message" to jurors.53 Because the appellate court did not suggest a procedure
for partial exclusion of courtroom spectators, the trial judge's response was to
pretend as though he had been concerned all along about physical disruption54
and subsequently to insist that Farrakhan and Stallings act in accordance with
his rules of decorum. 5 In the view of the D.C. Circuit, trial guests should
keep their hands and their feet to themselves, but their messages may run
amuck. In reality, Farrakhan's and Stallings's manners in the courtroom were
an issue created by the appellate court. Ironically, the trial judge's
response-the patronizing insistence that Farrakhan and Stallings agree to
behave themselves-smacks of racism more than does his initial decision to
exclude them from the courtroom.
United States v. Barry suggests that no trial spectator can be barred from
a courtroom unless she threatens physically to disrupt the trial. In this respect,
the court established a severe restriction on the discretion of judges to control
public access to trials. Not all courts have taken this position, however. Two
of the few other federal appellate courts that have considered symbolic
communication by trial spectators have found it appropriate to regulate this
type of communication. In one case, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[w]hen fair
trial rights are at significant risk. . . the first amendment rights of trial
attendees can and must be curtailed at the courthouse door.' 56 In another
case, the Eleventh Circuit ordered the retrial of a man convicted of the murder
of a prison guard, partly because of the presence, at the first trial, of numerous
uniformed prison guards.57 The court was concerned that the guards' presence
posed an unacceptable risk of prejudicing the jurors.58
Significantly, the decisions from the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits involved
cases in which the presence of the spectators was not thought to implicate race.
52. Id. at *2.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. Compare Terry, supra note 36, at A] (reporting judge's insistence that Farrakhan and Stallings
act with "decorum") with Terry, supra note 23, at A13 (quoting judge's statement that Farrakhan's
"'presence would be potentially disruptive, very likely intimidating, and he is a persona non grata for the
[rest] of this case.').
55. See Torry, supra note 36, at Al.
56. Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 1990).
57. Woods v. Dugger, 923 F2d 1454 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 953 (1991). In this case, the
hidden message was pro-conviction, see id. at 1459-60, unlike the pro-acquittal messages in the cases
involving Barry and Harvey.
58. See id.
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The D.C. Circuit is the first appellate court to consider a "forbidden" racial
message.59 My intention in noting this distinction is not to criticize the
restrictive standard the D.C. Circuit established; indeed, there are potentially
troubling implications of standards that allow trial judges more discretion in
terms of which "secret" messages to regulate.61 I suggest, however, that the
D.C. Circuit's holding was not mandated by clear constitutional dictates and
was not supported by precedent from other federal jurisdictions. Indeed, other
appellate courts have considered and regulated the contents of the messages
that trial spectators were thought to be sending. Those cases suggest that the
D.C. Circuit could have talked about race, and yet it did not.
2. The Skeptics: What's Race Got to Do with It?
The response of a number of commentators to the controversy over John
Harvey's kente cloth was disdainful of the trial judge's apprehension about
race-based appeals to black jurors. For example, the Washington 2imes
characterized one of the judge's concerns as "[s]heer, unadulterated
goofiness.' The editorial continued:
[The judge] apparently believes that the [kente] cloth is no innocent
fabric but rather possesses hypnotic powers of seduction, powers that
will turn the judicial system on its head and hold jurors in its sway.
... [W]hile most of us common folk are puzzled by this kind of
judicial behavior, lawyers are widely inured to the fact that judges are
free to act like fools with impunity-even when it is an abuse of
discretion, an abuse of power, a waste of time and an injustice to
someone who has come before the court seeking justice.6"
The Washington Post opined:
There is absolutely no reason in logic or law for Judge Scott to tell
Mr. Harvey that he cannot wear a kente cloth before a
jury-regardless of the jurors' race. The very suggestion is offensive
to black jurors, that they somehow lose their judgment and objectivity
at the sight of a kente cloth.63
59. A New Jersey court, in the state trial of a white police officer accused of killing a black youth,
prohibited the Rev. Al Sharpton, a controversial black activist, from attending. See Judge Bars Al Sharpton
From Courtroom in Teaneck Trial, UPI, Jan. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File. This
decision was not appealed.
60. But for a critique of the circuit court's decision, see Terri A. Belanger, Note, Symbolic Expression
in the Courtroom: The Right to a Fair Trial Versus Freedom of Speech, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 318
(1994).
61. Kente Cloth in the Dock, WASH. TIMES, June 13, 1992, at D2.
62. Id.
63. Judging the Kente Cloth, supra note 50, at A20.
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The National Bar Association, an African-American lawyers' group, expressed
a similar concern,64 and one black attorney called the judge's actions "'almost
unbelievable' and wondered why the judge "'injected race"' into the trial
proceedings by making an issue of the kente cloth.65 Even the prosecutors in
the kente cloth case "remained conspicuously silent" and refrained from
endorsing the judge's concerns about the cloth.66
D. The Forbidden Message Revealed
I am fascinated by the refusal of these actors to take seriously the
possibility and legal implications of black jurors' sympathy with black
defendants. 67 The criminal justice system would be better served if there were
less reluctance to consider the significance of race in black jurors'
adjudications of guilt or innocence. The remainder of this Essay argues that
race matters when a black person violates American criminal law and when a
black juror decides how she6s should exercise her power to put another black
man in prison.
The idea that race matters in criminal justice is hardly shocking; it surely
does not surprise most African-Americans. 69 In the Barry and Harvey stories,
I believe that it was known by all of the key players: judges, jurors, attorneys,
defendants, and spectators. The trial judges in those cases were correct:
Somebody-the controversial black demagogue, the radical black priest, the
kente-cloth-wearing lawyer-was trying to send the black jurors a message.
The message, in my view, was that the black jurors should consider the
evidence presented at trial in light of the idea that the American criminal
64. See Chartrand, supra note 40, at 18.
65. Murawski, supra note 44, at 6 (quoting attorney Nathaniel Speights).
66. Id.
67. Given that acknowledgement of my premise is widespread enough to be incorporated into a
training session at the U.S. Attorney's Office, the dearth of scholarship on the issue initially seems
surprising. In fact, precious few members of the legal academy write about the intersection of race and
crime at all. See Norval Morris, Race and Crime: What Evidence Is There That Race Influences Results
in the Criminal Justice System?, 72 JUDICATURE 111, 112 (1988) ("It's no good going to the legal scholars
of this country to answer [the question posed in the title], they don't deal with it, they don't write about
it, and they don't discuss it publicly.").
To the extent that this Essay makes a case for letting guilty black criminals go free, it lends itself to
the description "radical" The label is one I accept proudly, because it suggests the degree of my discomfort
with the status quo. The label is not, however, the most comfortable appellation for one who wishes to he
heard in the current political climate. So I ask the reader to remember that if my thesis is radical, then so
too are many ordinary black people when they approach their work as jurors.
68. As will be seen below, I use "he" when referring to defendants because most defendants are male
and "she" when referring jurors, both to counter the sexist implications of using the generic "he" and to
distinguish the juror from the defendant. I do not intend to connote any special gender roles by my use of
these pronouns.
69. See infra Subsection II.A.3.
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justice system discriminates against blacks. The message was that the jurors
should not send another black man to prison.7"
There is no way to "prove" what Farrakhan's and Stallings's purposes
were in attending Barry's trial-nor can I "prove" the intent of the kente-cloth-
wearing lawyer. I believe that my theory that they were encouraging black
jurors' sympathy is reasonable, based on the relevant players' statements, the
trial judge's observations, and common sense and experience. Even if one is
unwilling to ascribe to those players the same racially based motivations that
I do, acknowledgement and concern that some black jurors acquit black
defendants on the basis of race are increasing, as my experience at the U.S.
Attorney's Office showed. For the remainder of this Essay, I focus on the legal
and social implications of this conduct by black jurors.
II. "JUSTICE OUTSIDE THE FORMAL RULES OF LAW"
7 1
Why would a black juror vote to let a guilty person go free? Assuming
that the juror is a rational actor, she must believe that she and her community
are, in some way, better off with the defendant out of prison than in prison.
But how could any rational person believe that about a criminal? The
following section describes racial critiques of the American criminal justice
system. I then examine the evolution of the doctrine of jury nullification and
argue that its practice by African-Americans is, in many cases, consistent with
the Anglo-American tradition and, moreover, is legally and morally right.
A. The Criminal Law and African-Americans: Justice or "Just us" ?72
Imagine a country in which more than half of the young male citizens are
under the supervision of the criminal justice system, either awaiting trial, in
prison, or on probation or parole.7 3 Imagine a country in which two-thirds of
70. An African-American poet described a black juror who voted, along with I 1 white male jurors,
against the interests of a black person in this way:
[The white male jurors] dragged her 4' 10" black woman's frame
over the hot coals of four centuries of white male approval
until she let go the first real power she ever had
and lined her own womb with cement
to make a graveyard for our children.
AUDRE LORDE, Power, in THE BLACK UNICORN 108, 109 (1978). The kente cloth says "don't do that."
71. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (describing scope of interests
served by jury system).
72. "Just us" is a familiar pun in the African-American community. See, e.g., Henry L. Gates, Jr.,
Thirteen Ways Of Looking AtA Black Man, NEW YORKER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 56, 58 ("As older blacks like
to repeat, 'when white folks say "justice," they mean "just us."'").
73. One study found that, in Baltimore, Maryland, 56% of the African-American males between the
ages of 18 and 35 were under criminal justice supervision on any given day in 1991. NATIONAL CTR. ON
INSTITUTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES, HOBBLING A GENERATION: YOUNG AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF AMERICA'S CITIES: BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 1 (1992). In Washington, D.C.,
this number was 42%. JEROME G. MILLER, HOBBLING A GENERATION: YOUNG AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES
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the men can anticipate being arrested before they reach age thirty.74 Imagine
a country in which there are more young men in prison than in college.
Now give the citizens of the country the key to the prison. Should they use it?
Such a country bears some resemblance to a police state. When we
criticize a police state, we think that the problem lies not with the citizens of
the state, but rather with the form of government or law, or with the powerful
elites and petty bureaucrats whose interests the state serves. Similarly, racial
critics of American criminal justice locate the problem not so much with the
black prisoners as with the state and its actors and beneficiaries. As evidence,
they cite their own experiences and other people's stories,76 African-Americari
history, understanding gained from social science research on the power and
pervasiveness of white supremacy, and ugly statistics like those in the
preceding paragraph.
For analytical purposes, I will create a false dichotomy among racial critics
by dividing them into two camps: liberal critics and radical critics. Those are
not names that the critics have given themselves or that they would necessarily
accept, and there would undoubtedly be disagreement within each camp and
IN VASHINGTON, D.C.'s CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (1992); see also Jerome G. Miller, From Social
Safety Net to Dragnet: African-American Males in the Criminal Justice System, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
479, 487-88 (1994).
Evidence on which to base comparisons with other groups is relatively scarce. For example, similar
figures are not available for Latinos, see Robert Garcia, Latinos and Criminal Justice, 14 CHICANO-LATINO
L. REv. 6, 7 (1994), although a Justice Department study found that 14% of state inmates in 1990 were
Hispanic, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1990, at 9 (1990).
74. In California, nearly two-thirds of all black males are arrested at some point between the ages of
18 and 30. See Robert Tillman, The Size of the "Criminal Population:" The Prevalence and Incidence of
Adult Arrest, 25 CRIMINOLOGY 561, 567, 576 (1987) (finding that by age 30, 65.5% of black males in
California who turned 18 in 1974 had been arrested).
75. In 1991, 583,545 blacks were in local jails (188,300 people) or under the jurisdiction of state and
federal correctional authorities (395,245 people). See U.S. DEP'T OF JUS'rICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1993, at 592, 606 (1994) [hereinafter
SOURCEBOOK 1993]. The number of black men in college in the same year was approximately 517,000.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1994, supra note 13, at 178.
76. See Gates, supra note 72, at 58. As Gates recounts:
Blacks-in particular, black men-swap their [negative] experiences of police encounters like
war stories, and there are few who don't have more than one story to tell. "These stories have
a ring of clich6 about them," Erroll McDonald, Pantheon's executive editor and one of the few
prominent blacks in publishing, says, "but, as we all know about clichs, they're almost always
true." McDonald tells of renting a Jaguar in New Orleans and being stopped by the
police-simply "to show cause why I shouldn't be deemed a problematic Negro in a possibly
stolen car." [The jazz trumpeter] Wynton Marsalis says, "Shit, the police slapped me upside the
head when I was in high school. I wasn't Wynton Marsalis then. I was just another nigger
standing out somewhere on the street whose head could be slapped and did get slapped." The
crime novelist Walter Mosley recalls, "When I was a kid in Los Angeles, they used to stop me
all the time, beat on me, follow me around, tell me that I was stealing things." Nor does
[sociologist] William Julius Wilson ... wonder why he was stopped near a small New England
town by a policeman who wanted to know what he was doing in those parts. There's a moving
violation that many African-Americans know as D.W.B.: Driving While Black.
Id. at 58-59. Gates concludes that, as "Wynton Marsalis says, 'My worst fear is to have to go before the
criminal-justice system.' Absurdly enough, it's mine, too." Id. at 59.
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theoretical overlap between the camps. Nonetheless, for the purposes of a brief
explication of racial critiques, my oversimplification may be useful.
1. The Liberal Critique
According to this critique, American criminal justice is racist because it
is controlled primarily by white people, who are unable to escape the culture's
dominant message of white supremacy, and who are therefore inevitably, even
if unintentionally, prejudiced.77 These white actors include legislators, police,
prosecutors, judges, and jurors. They exercise their discretion to make and
enforce the criminal law in a discriminatory fashion.78 Sometimes the
discrimination is overt, as in the case of Mark Fuhrman, the police officer in
the O.J. Simpson case who, in interviews, used racist language and boasted of
his own brutality,79 and sometimes it is unintentional, as with a hypothetical
white juror who invariably credits the testimony of a white witness over that
of a black witness.
The problem with the liberal critique is that it does not adequately explain
the extent of the difference between the incidence of black and white crime,
especially violent crime. For example, in 1991, blacks constituted about fifty-
five percent of the 18,096 people arrested for murder and non-negligent
manslaughter in the United States (9924 people).80 One explanation the liberal
critique offers for this unfortunate statistic is that the police pursue black
murder suspects more aggressively than they do white murder suspects. In
other words, but for discrimination, the percentage of blacks arrested for
murder would be closer to their percentage of the population, roughly twelve
percent.8' The liberal critique would attribute some portion of the additional
forty-three percent of non-negligent homicide arrestees (in 1991, approximately
7781 people82) to race prejudice. Ultimately, however, those assumptions
strain credulity, not because many police officers are not racist, but because
there is no evidence that there is a crisis of that magnitude in criminal justice.
77. For a general discussion of this critique, see CORAMAE R. MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION
OF COLOR (1993). For a discussion of the impact of white supremacy on whites in general, see Edward P.
Boyle, It's Not Easy Bein' Green: The Psychology of Racism, Environmental Discrimination, and the
Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REv. 937, 940-45 (1993), and on
liberal whites in particular, see Naomi Wolf, The Racism of Well-Meaning White People, GLAMOUR, Aug.
1995, at 230.
78. See Gary Peller, Criminal Law, Race, and the Ideology of Bias: Transcending the Critical Tools
of the Sixties, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2231, 2231 (1993) (arguing that "[n]o fancy theoretical conceptualization
is necessary to explain how race figures in police brutality, in prosecutorial decisions, in jury selection, in
conviction rates, and in the incarceration and capital sentencing of people of color in America").
79. See Charles Madigan, A Bad Day for Cops; Police Feeling Heat; Experts Cite Improvements in
Race Relations, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 31, 1995, § 1, at I (describing police reactions to disclosure of recordings
of Fuhrman making racist statements).
80. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 1992, at 434 (1993) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK 1992].
81. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1994, supra note 13, at 13.
82. See SOURCEBOOK 1992, supra note 80, at 434.
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In fact, for all the faults of American law enforcement, catching the bad guys
seems to be something it does rather well. The liberal critique fails to account
convincingly for the incidence of black crime.
2. The Radical Critique
The radical critique does not discount the role of discrimination in
accounting for some of the racial disparity in crime rates, but it also does not,
in contrast to the liberal critique, attribute all or even most of the differential
to police and prosecutor prejudice. The radical critique offers a more
fundamental, structural explanation.
It suggests that criminal law is racist83 because, like other American law,
it is an instrument of white supremacy.' Law is made by white elites to
protect their interests and, especially, to preserve the economic status quo,
which benefits those elites at the expense of blacks, among others.85 Due to
discrimination and segregation, the majority of African-Americans receive few
meaningful educational and employment opportunities and, accordingly, are
unable to succeed, at least in the terms of the capitalist ideal.86 Some property
crimes committed by blacks may be understood as an inevitable result of the
tension between the dominant societal message equating possession of material
resources with success and happiness and the power of white supremacy to
83. In the legal academy, this critique has been advanced by only a few critical race theorists, see, e.g.,
DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 329-47 (3d ed. 1992); Regina Austin, "The Black
Community" Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1780-81 (1992)
(noting relationship between black poverty and decisions to engage in criminal activity); Dorothy E.
Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color Equality, and the Right of Privacy,
104 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1435-36 (1991), and by even fewer critical legal studies scholars, see, e.g.,
Peller, supra note 78, at 2231, 2248. In the legal academy generally, racial critiques, especially radical ones,
are rarely heard. See id. at 2231 (noting that "[t]he very ease with which the racial bias of the criminal
justice system can be described ... has perhaps fostered a lack of serious critical consideration of how
criminal law interacts with American racism"); see also Katheryn K. Russell, A Critical View from the
Inside: An Application of Critical Legal Studies to Criminal Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 222,
222-26 (1993) (noting paucity of critical legal studies work on criminal law). As Randall Kennedy astutely
suggests, however, there are advocates of racial critiques of criminal justice in popular culture, primarily
rap musicians. See Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment,
107 HARV. L. REv. 1255, 1258 n.10 (1994) (citing "F*ck Tha Police" by rap group N.W.A.).
84. See BELL, supra note 83, at 46-50, 60-63; Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction,
67 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1945-47 (1993).
85. Cf. Derrick Bell, The Racism is Permanent Thesis: Courageous Revelation or Unconscious Denial
of Racial Genocide, 22 CAP. U. L. REv. 571, 571 (1993) (arguing that "[w]ithout the deflecting power of
racism, masses of whites would likely wake up to and revolt against the severe disadvantage they suffer
in income and opportunity when compared with those whites at the top of our socio-economic heap"). Bell
notes that the economic status quo also provides little benefit for most white Americans. He cites statistics
suggesting that individuals in the nation's top one-fifth in terms of income earn more than the other four-
fifths combined, and that the top two million income earners earn more than the next one hundred million
combined. See id. at 576. For a Marxist analysis of the relationship between race and class in a capitalist
system, see MELVIN M. LEIMAN, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RACISM (1993).
86. Cf. Good For Business: Making Full Use of the Nation's Human Capital, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 52 (Mar. 17, 1995) (reporting results of study that show that, despite 30 years of affirmative action,
95% of senior management positions are still held by white men, who constitute 43% of work force).
1995]
The Yale Law Journal
prevent most African-Americans from acquiring "enough" of those resources
in a legal manner. "Black-on-black" violent crime, and even "victimless" crime
like drug offenses, can be attributed to internalized racism, which causes some
African-Americans to devalue black lives-either those of others or their own.
The political process does not allow for the creation or implementation of
effective "legal" solutions to this plight,87 and the criminal law punishes
predictable reactions to it.88
I am persuaded by the radical critique when I wonder about the roots of
the ugly truth that blacks commit many crimes at substantially higher rates
than whites. Most white Americans, especially liberals, would publicly offer
an environmental, as opposed to genetic, explanation for this fact.89 They
would probably concede that racism, historical and current, plays a major role
in creating an environment that breeds criminal conduct. From this premise,
the radical critic deduces that but for the (racist) environment, the African-
American criminal would not be a criminal. In other words, racism creates and
sustains the criminal breeding ground, which produces the black criminal.
Thus, when many African-Americans are locked up, it is because of a situation
that white supremacy created.
Obviously, most blacks are not criminals, even if every black is exposed
to racism. To the radical critics, however, the law-abiding conduct of the
majority of African-Americans does not mean that racism does not create black
criminals. Not everyone exposed to a virus will become sick, but that does not
mean that the virus does not cause the illness of the people who do.
The radical racial critique of criminal justice is premised as much on the
criminal law's effect as on its intent. The system is discriminatory, in part,
because of the disparate impact law enforcement has on the black
87. See Tilden J. LeMelle, Foreword to RICHARD M. BURKEY, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES at x (1971) (questioning "whether a society such as that of the United
States is really capable of legislating and enforcing effective public policy to combat racial discrimination").
88. See, e.g., john a. powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National Purse,
the Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557, 609-14 (1991) (arguing that
disproportionate number of black men prosecuted for drug-related crimes is evidence that arrests target
black community and are form of institutionalized racism); Roberts, supra note 84, at 1946 (arguing that
"[t]he American criminal justice system has historically served as a means of controlling blacks"). For a
discussion of the role of white supremacy in facilitating black-on-black crime, see Derrick Bell, Learning
the Three "I's" of American Slave Heritage, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1037, 1046 (1993) ("Victimized
themselves by an uncaring society, some young blacks vent their rage on victims like themselves, thereby
perpetuating the terror that once whites had to invoke directly."), and Stephen L. Carter, When Victims
Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE LJ. 420, 427 (1988) (describing, but not endorsing, theory that black-on-
black crime is "statement of frustration" and that if you "[r]emove the sources of the frustration-the
racism, the 'structural' unemployment, the inadequate education ... you eliminate much of the violence").
89. When I say that most white Americans would "publicly" offer an environmental explanation for
the relationship between race and crime, I mean that they would not publicly endorse a genetic theory, even
if they believed such a theory to be true. But cf. RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL
CURVE (1994) (giving genetic "explanation" and arguing that most white Americans actually endorse that
explanation).
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community.9 This unjust effect is measured in terms of the costs to the black
community of having so many African-Americans, particularly males,
incarcerated or otherwise involved in the criminal justice system. These costs
are social and economic, and include the perceived dearth of men "eligible"
for marriage,91 the large percentage of black children who live in female-
headed households,92 the lack of male "role models" for black children,
especially boys,93 the absence of wealth in the black community,94 and the
large unemployment rate among black men.95
3. Examples of Racism in Criminal Justice
Examples commonly cited by both liberal and radical critics as evidence
of racism in criminal justice include: the Scottsboro case;96 the history of the
criminalization of drug use;97 past and contemporary administration of the
90. As I discuss below, some people regard effects-based racial critiques of criminal law as
counterproductive and ultimately harmful to the black community. See infra Subsection II.A.4. There is,
however, precedent in other areas of the law, e.g., employment discrimination law, suggesting that a racially
disparate effect is either prima facie evidence of racial discrimination or otherwise indicative of a practice
or policy that should be changed. See, e.g., Griggs 4. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding
that Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 "proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that
are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation"). Legal scholars have described theories of discrimination
that seek remedies for disparate racial effects as coming from "outsider" or "victim" jurisprudential
perspectives. See, e.g., Mai J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989). In fact, this perspective may be gaining more influence in criminal law.
For example, the United States Sentencing Commission recently recommended that the distinction between
powdered cocaine and base ("crack") cocaine, see infra note 103, be eliminated, based in part on the
racially disparate effect. See Correcting Cocaine Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1995, at A24.
91. See TERRY MCMILLAN, WAITING TO EXHALE 332 (1992) (listing incarceration as one of number
of factors to which black female characters in book attribute lack of available black men).
92. In 1993, there were 5,757,000 black children under the age of 18 who lived with their mother
only, while 3,796,000 black children under the age of 18 lived with both parents. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
1994, supra note 13, at 67.
93. See DETRorr PUB. SCH., MALE ACADEMY GRADES K-8: A DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM FOR AT-
RISK MALES 26 (1991); Rogers Worthington, Milwaukee Idea Shapes a New School, CH. TRIB., Dec. 1,
1991, at 25.
94. The median income for black households in 1992 was $18,660, while the median income for all
households in 1992 was $30,786. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1994, supra note 13, at 464.
95. The unemployment rate for black males in 1993 was 13.8%, id. at 403, as opposed to 6.8% for
all workers, id. at 396. Ex-convicts, many of whom are black, often find it more difficult to find
employment. See, e.g., Chi Chi Sileo, Men Forced to March to Different Drummer; Boot Camps Try to
Turn Offenders Around, WASH. TIMES, July 6, 1994, at A9 (stating that most employment programs for
ex-convicts have less than 50% placement rate).
96. In the 1930s, nine black youths were riding a freight train in Alabama when a fight broke out after
a white male stepped on the hand of one of the youths. Several white males were thrown off the train as
a result of the fight. Hearing reports of the melee, dozens of armed white men stopped the train and locked
the black youths in a Scottsboro, Alabama jail. Two white, female passengers on the train accused the black
youths of having raped them. At trial, eight of the youths were convicted and sentenced to die; a mistrial
was declared in the case of the ninth defendant. The defendants were reindicted several times after the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed the convictions and sentences on the ground of racial discrimination. See generally
DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969) (providing detailed historical
account of Scottsboro cases); JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTrsBORO (1994) (providing narrative of
Scottsboro cases and their effects on life during the Depression).
97. Cf. TROY DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY (1970) (showing how moralistic judgments
are made to criminalize previously accepted practices and behavior). See generally DAVID F. MUSTO, THE
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death penalty;9" the use of imagery linking crime to race in the 1988
presidential campaign99 and other political campaigns;o° the beating of
Rodney King and the acquittal of his police assailants;'' disparities between
punishments for white-collar crimes and punishments for other crimes;"0 2
more severe penalties for crack cocaine users than for powder cocaine
users;'0 3 the Charles Murray and Susan Smith cases; 1' 4 police corruption
scandals in minority neighborhoods in New York and Philadelphia;0 5 the
O.J. Simpson case, including the extraordinary public and media fascination
with it, 0 6  the racist police officer who was the prosecution's star
AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL (1973) (reviewing history of cocaine use and
narcotic control in United States); Patricia A. Morgan, The Legislation of Drug Law: Economic Crisis and
Social Control, 8 J. DRUG ISSUES 53 (1978) (examining process of early drug legislation through look at
California's first opium law).
98. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312-13 (1987) (stating that racial disparities in sentencing
are unavoidable part of criminal justice system and do not violate Constitution); see also Randall L.
Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REv.
1388 (1988).
99. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, The Politics of Race; When George Bush Made Willie Horton Part of His
Campaign Team, the Issue Wasn't Just Crime-It Was Racial Fear. Michael Dukakis' Campaign Manager
Saw It Happening, and Blames Herself or Not Speaking Out, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1989, Magazine, at
W20.
100. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Helms Kindled Anger in Campaign, and May Have Set Tone for
Others, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1990, at B3 (reporting on Jesse Helms's use of racial imagery in his senatorial
campaign against black challenger Harvey Gantt); Cathleen Decker, Race Often Plays Real but Unspoken
Role in Politics; Campaigns: Candidates Shun Overt Appeals to Prejudice, but Social Scientists Say It
Underlies Many Issues, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1994, at Al (discussing racial undertones of political
advertisements in California on crime, immigration, and welfare reform).
101. See generally INDEPENDENT COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, REPORT OFTHE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 9-17 (1991) (recounting police beating of
Rodney King and its repercussions).
102. See JAMES W. COLEMAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE: THE SOCIOLOGY OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME 168
(1985) (noting that "white collar criminals receive much more lenient sentences than other criminals
receive"); cf. EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION 56-60 (1983)
(discussing tendency of public to view white-collar crimes with less resentment than other crimes).
103. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines treat one gram of crack as equivalent to 100 grams of powder
cocaine for sentencing purposes. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2DI.I(c) (1994) (listing substance quantities and corresponding base offense levels). In State
v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991), the Minnesota Supreme Court invalidated Minnesota's
sentencing scheme, which punished possession of crack more severely than powder cocaine. Id. at 891. In
Minnesota in 1988, approximately 97% of all persons charged with possession of crack were black, while
approximately 80% of all persons charged with possession of powdered cocaine were white. Id. at 887 n.1;
see also Kennedy, supra note 83, at 1262 (citing Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 887 n.1); Matthew F Leitman,
A Proposed Standard of Equal Protection Review for Classifications Within the Criminal Justice System
That Have a Racially Disparate Impact: A Case Study of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Classification
Between Crack and Powder Cocaine, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 215, 216 (1994) (same); Knoll D. Lowney,
Smoked Not Snorted: Is Racism Inherent in Our Crack Cocaine Laws?, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP.
L. 121, 162 n.232 (1994) (same).
104. See Michael Quintanilla, Divided We Stand; Boston. South Carolina. Oklahoma City The
Misplaced Finger of Blame in Each Case Points up the Delicate Nature of Race Relations, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 1995, at El.
105. See N.R. Kleinfield with James C. McKinley, Jr., Paths to Scandal: A Special Report; Stories
of Courage and Sacrifice, Corruption and Betrayal in Blue, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1994, at Al; Don Terry,
Philadelphia Shaken by Criminal Police Officers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1995, at Al.
106. See, e.g,, Lloyd Grove, Race and the Simpson Case; As the Story Unfolds, Debate Simmers over
the Color Question, WASH. POST, June 27, 1994, at DI; Jim Newton & Andrea Ford, Lawyers Bitterly
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witness, 10 7 and the response of many white people to the jury's verdict of
acquittal;'0° and, cited most frequently, the extraordinary rate of incarceration
of African-American men.1' 9
4. Law Enforcement Enthusiasts
Of course, the idea that the criminal justice system is racist and oppressive
is not without dissent, and among the dissenters are some African-Americans.
Randall Kennedy succinctly poses the counterargument:
Although the administration of criminal justice has, at times, been
used as an instrument of racial oppression, the principal problem
facing African-Americans in the context of criminal justice today is
not over-enforcement but under-enforcement of the laws. The most
lethal danger facing African-Americans in their day-to-day lives is not
white, racist officials of the state, but private, violent criminals
(typically black) who attack those most vulnerable to them without
regard to racial identity." °
According to these theorists, whom I will call law enforcement enthusiasts, the
criminal law may have a disproportionate impact on the black community, but
this is not a moral or racial issue because the disproportionate impact is the
law's effect, not its intent. For law enforcement enthusiasts, intent is the most
Debate Race in Simpson Case, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1995, at Al; Adam Pertman, Race Comes to Fore in
Simpson Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 14, 1995, at 1.
107. See Madigan, supra note 79, at 1.
108. See Gates, supra note 72, at 56. Gates notes:
[I]n the aftermath of the Simpson trial the focus of attention has been swiftly displaced from
the verdict to the reaction to the verdict, and then to the reaction to the reaction to the verdict,
and, finally, to the reaction to the reaction to the reaction to the verdict-which is to say, black
indignation at white anger at black jubilation at Simpson's acquittal.
Id.; see also Courtland Milloy, In White Riot, It's Smolder Baby, Smolder, WVAsH. POST, Oct. 8, 1995, at
BI ("Have you ever seen a white riot? It started when OJ. Simpson was acquitted. It's not like in the early
1900's when they'd lynch you if they thought justice had not been served. It's more subtle now .... ").
109. Blacks constituted 12.4% of the United States population in 1992, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1994,
supra note 13, at 13, but represented 30.3% of all arrests, id. at 205. In the same year, blacks constituted
44.1% of all jail inmates, SOURCEBOOK 1993, supra note 75, at 592, and nearly 48% of those under the
jurisdiction of state and federal correctional authorities, see id. at 606.
110. Kennedy, supra note 83, at 1259 (footnotes omitted); see also Thomas Sowell, Vigilantes in Los
Angeles: Before We Give In to a Lynch-Mob Mentality, We Have to Look Beyond Chief Gates, ARIz.
REPUBLIC, Mar. 24, 1991, at C5 (arguing that restrictions on conduct of law enforcement officials,
especially restrictions set out by judiciary, have resulted in inadequate protection for law-abiding citizens).
There is no doubt that African-Americans are disproportionately the victims of crime. For example, in 1992,
blacks accounted for approximately 49% of all murder victims. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1994, supra note
13, at 201; see also Ralph R. Reiland, If They Do the Crime... Why Shouldn't They Do Most of the
Time?, CIII. TRIB., Mar. 17, 1995, at 19 (stating that 95% of black murder victims are murdered by other
blacks and quoting African-American former police chief of Washington, D.C. as saying that "[w]e would
riot if whites killed this many blacks").
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appropriate barometer of governmental racism.' Because law enforcement
is a public good, it is in the best interest of the black community to have more,
rather than less, of it. Allowing criminals to live unfettered in the community
would harm, in particular, the black poor, who are disproportionately the
victims of violent crime. Indeed, the logical conclusion of the enthusiasts'
argument is that African-Americans would be better off with more, not fewer,
black criminals behind bars.
To my mind, the enthusiasts embrace law enforcement too uncritically:
They are blind to its opportunity costs. I agree that criminal law enforcement
constitutes a public good for African-Americans when it serves the social
protection goals that Professor Kennedy highlights. In other words, when
locking up black men means that "violent criminals... who attack those most
vulnerable"' 12  are off the streets, most people-including most law
enforcement critics-would endorse the incarceration. But what about when
locking up a black man has no or little net effect on public safety, when, for
example, the crime with which he was charged is victimless?" 3 Putting aside
for a moment the legal implications, couldn't an analysis of the costs and
benefits to the African-American community present an argument against
incarceration? I argue "yes," in light of the substantial costs to the community
of law enforcement. I accept that other reasonable people may disagree. But
the law enforcement enthusiasts seldom acknowledge that racial critics even
weigh the costs and benefits; their assumption seems to be that the racial
critics are foolish or blinded by history or motivated by their own
ethnocentrism." 4
11. Professor Kennedy makes the argument concisely:
[S]ome condemn as "genocide" the punitive "war on drugs" because a disproportionate number
of those subjected to arrest, prosecution, and incarceration for drug use are black.... No one
[however] ... has come forward with credible evidence to suggest that American drug policy
is truly genocidal-that is, deliberately designed to eradicate a people.
Kennedy, supra note 83, at 1261 (footnote omitted). Ironically, that racist intent may be measured by the
number of black criminals who are not imprisoned or executed. Some enthusiasts argue that
underenforcement of the criminal law in the African-American community may be the result of a willful
reluctance to protect the interests of black victims. See id. at 1256 (arguing that underenforcement in black
communities "often stems from a pervasive and racist devaluation of black victims of crime"). In
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the Supreme Court considered an empirical study that claimed
that black murderers were significantly more likely to receive the death penalty if their victims were white.
The Court held that there were too many variables present in capital cases for the study to prove
conclusively what it purported to prove. The Court noted, however, that "[t]here is, of course, some risk
of racial prejudice influencing a jury's decision in a criminal case .... The question is 'at what point that
risk becomes constitutionally unacceptable."' Id. at 308-09 (quoting Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 n.8
(1986)). Professor Kennedy has argued that the risk is unacceptable when the black community loses the
benefit of equal protection of the criminal law. See Kennedy, supra note 98, at 1421-29. He maintains that
"the unfairness that race-of-the-victim discrimination visits upon the black community [lies in] denying it
equal treatment with respect to those who kill its members." Id. at 1391.
112. Kennedy, supra note 83, at 1259.
113. See infra Section III.A.
114. Professor Kennedy, for example, writes:
[Racial critics] frequently proceed as if there existed no dramatic discontinuities in American
history, as if there existed little difference between the practices and sentiments that
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5. The Body Politic and the Racial Critiques
I suspect that many white people would agree with the racial critics'
analysis, even if most whites would not support a solution involving the
emancipation of black criminals. I write this Essay, however, out of concern
for African-Americans and how they can use the power they have now to
create change. The important practicability question is how many African-
Americans embrace racial critiques of the criminal justice system and how
many are law enforcement enthusiasts?
According to a recent USA TodaylCNN/Gallup poll, sixty-six percent of
blacks believe that the criminal justice system is racist and only thirty-two
percent believe it is not racist. 11 Interestingly, other polls suggest that blacks
also tend to be more worried about crime than whites;" 6 this seems logical
when one considers that blacks are more likely to be the victims of crime. 7
This enhanced concern, however, does not appear to translate into endorsement
of tougher enforcement of traditional criminal law. For example, substantially
fewer blacks than whites support the death penalty," 8 and many more blacks
than whites were concerned with the potential racial consequences of the strict
provisions of the Crime Bill of 1994."' While polls are not, perhaps, the
most reliable means of measuring sentiment in the African-American
characterized the eras of slavery and de jure segregation and those prevalent today, as if
African-Americans had completely failed in their efforts to reform and participate in the creation
and implementation of government policy ....
Kennedy, supra note 83, at 1258. Kennedy later argues that racial critics' solutions to black criminal
victimization are "confused and hobbled by a reflexive, self-defeating resort to charges of racism." Id. at
1260.
115. See Maria Puente, Poll: Blacks' Confidence in Police Plummets, USA TODAY, Mar. 21, 1995,
at 3A. Only 37% of whites expressed a belief that the system is racist, while 59% of whites said it was not
racist. Id. The poll's finding on attitudes toward police are even more revealing. Only 33% of blacks agreed
with the proposition that police generally testify truthfully. Id. In stark contrast, 70% of whites expressed
the view that police generally testify truthfully. Id. Other polls have found similar results with regard to
black attitudes towards criminal justice. See, e.g., U.S. Blacks See Media, Law Bias, UPI, July 16, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File (reporting results of poll finding that 54% of blacks thought
criminal justice system was biased against blacks).
116. See, e.g., Claude R. Marx, How Representative Are They?, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Aug. 10,
1994, at I (noting Time-CNN poll that "indicated [that] 25% of all blacks believe crime is the nation's most
important problem while 19% of the general population believes that," and Gallup Poll that "indicate[d]
that 94% of blacks consider crime a very important problem, while 85% of whites did [sic]").
117. The victimization rate of blacks is higher than that of any other racial group for almost all crimes,
including murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and larceny. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1994, supra
note 13, at 201, 203 (giving figures for 1992).
118. See Marx, supra note 116, at I (reporting poll conducted by Joint Center for Political and
Economic Studies indicating that 48% of blacks support capital punishment, compared to 70% of general
public).
119. See, e.g., Ronald Brownstein, Clinton's "New Democrat" Agenda Reopens Racial Divisions;
President's Ideas on Crime and Welfare Don't Sit Well With Blacks In Congress. Liberals' Dissatisfaction
May Be Rising, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1994, at A5 (reporting that 43% of blacks, but only 18% of whites,
said that tougher crime measures would be enforced in discriminatory fashion). The Crime Bill of 1994 can
be found at Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796
(1995).
The Yale Law Journal
community, the polls, along with significant evidence from popular
culture, 120  suggest that a substantial portion of the African-American
community sympathizes with racial critiques of the criminal justice system.
African-American jurors who endorse these critiques are in a unique
position to act on their beliefs when they sit in judgment of a black defendant.
As jurors, they have the power to convict the defendant or to set him free.
May the responsible exercise of that power include voting to free a black
defendant who the juror believes is guilty? The next section suggests that,
based on legal doctrine concerning the role of juries in general, and the role
of black jurors in particular, the answer to this question is "yes."
B. Jury Nullification
When a jury disregards evidence presented at trial and acquits an otherwise
guilty defendant, because the jury objects to the law that the defendant violated
or to the application of the law to that defendant, it has practiced jury
nullification. In this section, I describe the evolution of this doctrine and
consider its applicability to African-Americans. I then examine Supreme Court
cases that discuss the role of black people on juries. In light of judicial rulings
in these areas, I argue that it is both lawful and morally right that black jurors
consider race in reaching verdicts in criminal cases.
1. What Is Jury Nullification?
Jury nullification occurs when a jury acquits a defendant who it believes
is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. In finding the defendant not
guilty, the jury refuses to be bound by the facts of the case or the judge's
instructions regarding the law. Instead, the jury votes its conscience.
In the United States, the doctrine of jury nullification originally was based
on the common law idea that the function of a jury was, broadly, to decide
120. See Kennedy, supra note 83, at 1258 n.10, on the role of rap musicians in publicizing racial
critiques. Other examples of racial critiques abound in black popular culture. In literature, see, for example,
NATHAN MCCALL, MAKES ME WANNA HOLLER (1994), ALICE WALKER, THE COLOR PURPLE (1982), and
RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON (1940). In film, see, for example, Ernest Dickerson's JUICE (Paramount
Pictures 1992). Spike Lee's Do THE RIGHT THING (Universal Studios 1989) and MALCOLM X (Warner
Brothers 1992), and John Singleton's BOYz N THE HOOD (Columbia Pictures 1991). In art, see, for
example, JACOB LAWR.ENCE, Panel Number 22, in THE MIGRATION SERIES (1940-41) (depicting three black
men, handcuffed together, facing columns that look like prison bars, and accompanied by text stating:
"Migrants left. They did not feel safe. It was not wise to be found on the streets late at night. They were
arrested on the slightest provocation."). See generally THELMA GOLDEN, BLACK MALE: REPRESENTATIONS
OF MASCULINITY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ART (1994) (catalog from exhibit at Whitney Museum
of American Art).
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justice, which included judging the law as well as the facts.' If jurors
believed that applying a law would lead to an unjust conviction, they were not
compelled to convict someone who had broken that law. 2 Although most
American courts now disapprove of a jury's deciding anything other than the
"facts," the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits
appellate reversal of a jury's decision to acquit, regardless of the reason for the
acquittal.' 3 Thus, even when a trial judge thinks that a jury's acquittal
directly contradicts the evidence, the jury's verdict must be accepted as
final.'24 The jurors, in judging the law, function as an important and
necessary check on government power.
2. A Brief History
The prerogative of juries to nullify has been part of English and American
law for centuries. In 1670, the landmark decision in Bushell's Case
126
established the right of juries under English common law to nullify on the
basis of an objection to the law the defendant had violated. Two members of
an unpopular minority group-the Quakers-were prosecuted for unlawful
assembly and disturbance of the peace. At trial, the defendants, William Penn
and William Mead, admitted that they had assembled a large crowd on the
streets of London. Upon that admission, the judge asked the men if they
wished to plead guilty. Penn replied that the issue was not "'whether I am
guilty of this Indictment but whether this Indictment be legal,""' 27 and argued
that the jurors should go "behind" the law and use their consciences to decide
whether he was guilty.12 The judge disagreed, and he instructed the jurors
that the defendants' admissions compelled a guilty verdict. After extended
deliberation, however, the jurors found both defendants not guilty. The judge
then fined the jurors for rendering a decision contrary to the evidence and to
his instructions. When one juror, Bushell, refused to pay his fine, the issue
reached the Court of Common Pleas, which held that jurors in criminal cases
could not be punished for voting to acquit, even when the trial judge believed
121. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY
61 (1994).
122. Id.
123. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) ("To permit a second trial after an acquittal,
however mistaken the acquittal may have been, would present an unacceptably high risk that the
Government, with its vastly superior resources, might wear down the defendant so that 'even though
innocent, he may be found guilty."' (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957))); United
States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896) ("[I]n this country a verdict of acquittal, although not followed
by any judgment, is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.").
124. "[A] jury verdict of not guilty is not subject to reversal or to review in any manner whatsoever."
vAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.1(g) (2d ed. 1992).
125. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
126. 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
127. ABRAMSON, supra note 121, at 69 (quoting from 6 Howell's State Trials 958 (1670)).
128. Id. at 70 (citing 6 Howell's State Trials at 959-60).
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that the verdict contradicted the evidence. The reason was stated by the Chief
Justice of the Court of Common Pleas:
A man cannot see by anothers eye, nor hear by anothers ear, no more
can a man conclude or inferr the thing to be resolv'd by anothers
understanding or reasoning; and though the verdict be right the jury
give, yet they being not assur'd it is so from their own understanding,
are forsworn, at least in foro conscientiae.'29
This decision "changed the course of jury history."' 30 It is unclear why the
jurors acquitted Penn and Mead, but their act has been viewed in near
mythological terms. Bushell and his fellow jurors have come to be seen as
representing the best ideals of democracy because they "rebuffed the tyranny
of the judiciary and vindicated their own true historical and moral
purpose."'
131
American colonial law incorporated the common law prerogative of jurors
to vote according to their consciences after the British government began
prosecuting American revolutionaries for political crimes. 13' The best known
of these cases involved John Peter Zenger, who was accused of seditious libel
for publishing statements critical of British colonial rule in North America.
33
In seditious libel cases, English law required that the judge determine whether
the statements made by the defendant were libelous; the jury was not supposed
to question the judge's finding on this issue. At trial, Zenger's attorney told the
jury that it should ignore the judge's instructions that Zenger's remarks were
libelous because the jury "'ha[d] the right beyond all dispute to determine both
the law and the facts."",134 The lawyer then echoed the language of Bushell's
Case, arguing that the jurors had "'to see with their eyes, to hear with their
own ears, and to make use of their own consciences and understandings, in
judging of the lives, liberties or estates of their fellow subjects.
' '" 135
Famously, the jury acquitted Zenger, and another case entered the canon as a
shining example of the benefits of the jury system.
After Zenger's trial, the notion that juries should decide "justice," as
opposed to simply applying the law to the facts, became relatively settled in
129. Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1013.
130. ABRAMSON, supra note 121, at 72.
131. THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH
CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY, 1200-1800, at 225-26 (1985).
132. See ABRAMSON, supra note 121, at 68.
133. See id. at 73-75 (citing 17 Howell's State Trials 675 (1735)).
134. Philip B. Scott, Jury Nullification: An Historical Perspective on a Modem Debate, 91 NV. VA.
L. REV. 389, 414 (1989), quoted in M. Kristine Creagan, Jury Nullification: Assessing Recent Legislative
Developments, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1101, 1109 (1993).
135. JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER
PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 93 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1963) (1736).
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American jurisprudence. 36 In addition to pointing to political prosecutions
of white American revolutionaries like Zenger, modem courts and legal
historians often cite with approval nullification in trials of defendants "guilty"
of helping to free black slaves. 137 In these cases, Northern jurors with
abolitionist sentiments used their power as jurors to subvert federal law that
supported slavery. In United States v. Morris, 38 for example, three
defendants were accused of aiding and abetting a runaway slave's escape to
Canada. The defense attorney told the jury that, because it was hearing a
criminal case, it had the right to judge the law, and if it believed that the
Fugitive Slave Act was unconstitutional, it was bound to disregard any
contrary instructions given by the judge.13 9 The defendants were acquitted,
and the government dropped the charges against five other people accused of
the same crime. 4 ' Another success story entered the canon.
3. Sparf and Other Critiques
In the mid-nineteenth century, as memories of the tyranny of British rule
faded, some American courts began to criticize the idea of jurors deciding
justice.'14 A number of the state decisions that allowed this practice were
overruled,' 42 and in the 1895 case of Sparf v. United States, 43 the Supreme
Court spoke regarding jury nullification in federal courts.
In Sparf, two men on trial for murder requested that the judge instruct the
jury that it had the option of convicting them of manslaughter, a lesser-
included offense. The trial court refused this request and instead instructed the
jurors that if they convicted the defendants of any crime less than murder, or
if they acquitted them, the jurors would be in violation of their legal oath and
duties. The Supreme Court held that this instruction was not contrary to law
and affirmed the defendants' murder convictions. The Court acknowledged that
juries have the "'physical power"' to disregard the law, but stated that they
136. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("The pages of history
shine on instances of the jury's exercise of its prerogative to disregard uncontradicted evidence and
instructions of the judge."); Creagan, supra note 134, at 1109 ("Every jurisdiction which confronted the
issue of the jury's right to decide the law as well as the facts reached the same conclusion: American juries
had the right to decide the law.").
137. See, e.g., Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1130; ABRAMSON, supra note 121, at 80-85. The Fugitive Slave
Law of 1850 granted the slaveowner authority to remove a slave from a free state upon presenting
"satisfactory proof' of ownership in an exparte proceeding before a federal magistrate. Id. at 80. Although
the Fugitive Slave Law sought to avoid jury trials, those arrested and charged for aiding the escape of
fugitive slaves were often tried before juries. Id.
138. 26 F. Cas. 1323 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No. 15,815).
139. See id. at 1331.
140. See ABRAMSON, supra note 121, at 82 (citing Morris, 26 F Cas. 1323).
141. See id. at 75.
142. Id.
143. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
1995]
The Yale Law Journal
have no "'moral right"' to do so.'44 Indeed, the Court observed, "If the jury
were at liberty to settle the law for themselves, the effect would be... that
the law itself would be most uncertain, from the different views, which
different juries might take of it.' t" Despite this criticism, Sparf conceded
that, as a matter of law, a judge could not prevent jury nullification, because
in criminal cases "'[a] verdict of acquittal cannot be set aside.""' 146 An
anomaly was thus created, and has been a feature of American criminal law
ever since: Jurors have the power to nullify, but, in most jurisdictions, they
have no right to be informed of this power. 47
Since Sparf, most of the appellate courts that have considered jury
nullification have addressed that anomaly and have endorsed it.' Some of
these courts, however, have not been as critical of the concept of jury
nullification as the Sparf Court.149 The D.C. Circuit's opinion in United
States v. Dougherty50 is illustrative. In Dougherty, the court noted that the
ability of juries to nullify was widely recognized and even approved "as a
'necessary counter to case-hardened judges and arbitrary prosecutors."' 5'
This necessity, however, did not establish "as an imperative" that a jury be
informed by the judge of its power to nullify. 52 The D.C. Circuit was
concerned that "[w]hat makes for health as an occasional medicine would be
disastrous as a daily diet."'153 Specifically:
Rules of law or justice involve choice of values and ordering of
objectives for which unanimity is unlikely in any society, or group
representing the society, especially a society as diverse in cultures and
interests as ours. To seek unity out of diversity, under the national
motto, there must be a procedure for decision by vote of a majority
or prescribed plurality-in accordance with democratic philosophy. To
assign the role of mini-legislature to the various petit juries, who must
hang if not unanimous, exposes criminal law and administration to
144. Id. at 74 (quoting United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No.
14,545)).
145. Id. (quoting Battiste, 24 F Cas. at 1043).
146. Id. at 106 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 11 F. 470, 474 (C.C.D. Kan. 1882)).
147. The constitutions of Indiana and Maryland, however, state that juries shall be the judges of both
the law and the facts, see IND. CONST. art. I, § 19; MD. CONST. (DECL. OF RIGHTS) art. XXIII, and may
thus permit jurors hearing criminal cases to be instructed on their prerogative to nullify, see Clark v. State,
561 N.E.2d 759 (Ind. 1990) (upholding jury instructions that indicated that jurors could determine law as
well as facts); Stevenson v. State, 423 A.2d 558 (Md. 1980) (supporting contention that juries can judge
law, in accordance with Declaration of Rights in Maryland Constitution, but confining that right to
resolving conflicting interpretations of criminal statute and deciding whether to apply law to questionable
fact patterns).
148. See ABRAMSON, supra note 121, at 63.
149. Id. at 62.
150. 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
151. Id. at 1176 (quoting Abe Fortas in Follow-Up/The Jury, CENTER, July/Aug. 1970, at 59, 61).
152. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1176.
153. Id.
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paralysis, and to a deadlock that betrays rather than furthers the
assumptions of viable democracy.
15 4
The idea that jury nullification undermines the rule of law is the most
common criticism of the doctrine. The concern is that the meaning of self-
government is threatened when twelve individuals on a jury in essence remake
the criminal law after it has already been made in accordance with traditional
democratic principles. Another critique of African-American jurors engaging
in racially based jury nullification is that the practice by black jurors is distinct
from the historically approved cases because the black jurors are not so much
"judging" the law as preventing its application to members of their own race.
The reader should recognize that these are moral, not legal, critiques because,
as discussed above, the legal prerogative of any juror to acquit is well
established. In the next section, I respond to these moral critiques.
C. The Moral Case for Jury Nullification by African-Americans
Any juror legally may vote for nullification in any case, but, certainly,
jurors should not do so without some principled basis. The reason that some
historical examples of nullification are viewed approvingly is that most of us
now believe that the jurors in those cases did the morally right thing; it would
have been unconscionable, for example, to punish those slaves who committed
the crime of escaping to the North for their freedom. It is true that nullification
later would be used as a means of racial subordination by some Southern
jurors,'55 but that does not mean that nullification in the approved cases was
wrong. It only means that those Southern jurors erred in their calculus of
justice. I distinguish racially based nullification by African-Americans from
recent right-wing proposals for jury nullification156 on the ground that the
former is sometimes morally right and the latter is not.
The question of how to assign the power of moral choice is a difficult one.
Yet we should not allow that difficulty to obscure the fact that legal
resolutions involve moral decisions, judgments of right and wrong. The
fullness of time permits us to judge the fugitive slave case differently than the
Southern pro-white-violence case. One day we will be able to distinguish
between racially based nullification and that proposed by certain right-wing
activist groups.'57 We should remember that the morality of the historically
approved cases was not so clear when those brave jurors acted. After all, the
fugitive slave law was enacted through the democratic process, and those
jurors who disregarded it subverted the rule of law. Presumably, they were
154. Id.
155. See supra note 11.
156. See supra note 11.
157. See supra note 11.
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harshly criticized by those whose interests the slave law protected. Then, as
now, it is difficult to see the picture when you are inside the frame.
In this section, I explain why African-Americans have the moral right to
practice nullification in particular cases. 158 I do so by responding to the
traditional moral critiques of jury nullification.
1. African-Americans and the "Betrayal" of Democracy
There is no question that jury nullification is subversive of the rule of law.
It appears to be the antithesis of the view that courts apply settled, standing
laws and do not "dispense justice in some ad hoc, case-by-case basis."'159 To
borrow a phrase from the D.C. Circuit, jury nullification "betrays rather than
furthers the assumptions of viable democracy." 160 Because the Double
Jeopardy Clause makes this power part-and-parcel of the jury system, the issue
becomes whether black jurors have any moral right to "betray democracy" in
this sense. I believe that they do for two reasons that I borrow from the
jurisprudence of legal realism and critical race theory: First, the idea of "the
rule of law" is more mythological than real, and second, "democracy," as
practiced in the United States, has betrayed African-Americans far more than
they could ever betray it. Explication of these theories has consumed legal
scholars for years, and is well beyond the scope of this Essay. I describe the
theories below not to persuade the reader of their rightness, but rather to make
the case that a reasonable juror might hold such beliefs, and thus be morally
justified in subverting democracy through nullification.
2. The Rule of Law as Myth
The idea that "any result can be derived from the preexisting legal
doctrine" either in every case or many cases, 161 is a fundamental principle
of legal realism (and, now, critical legal theory). The argument, in brief, is that
158. This section illustrates why my argument is about race rather than class, even though the criminal
justice system may oppress poor white people as well as African-Americans. Were I concerned about social
change to the exclusion of morality, I would also encourage white jurors to engage in nullification in some
cases with white defendants, for white nullification would more quickly achieve my goal of the subversion
of the present criminal justice system. As I noted earlier, however, my focus is on black power; the moral
case I make is limited to African-Americans, based on their unique history and position in the United
States. Indeed, some of my analysis would not justify nullification by whites. My response to the betraying-
democracy critique, for example, argues that black juror nullification is morally justifiable because, in
American democracy, African-Americans suffer the tyranny of the majority. See infra Subsection II.C.4.
This argument would not apply to white people, not even to poor whites, because they are part of the
majority.
159. Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory ofInterpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 313 (1985).
160. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
161. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 462, 470 (1987) (describing "indeterminacy thesis").
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law is indeterminate and incapable of neutral interpretation. 62 When judges
"decide" cases, they "choose" legal principles to determine particular
outcomes. Even if a judge wants to be neutral, she cannot, because, ultimately,
she is vulnerable to an array of personal and cultural biases and influences; she
is only human. In an implicit endorsement of the doctrine of jury nullification,
legal realists also suggest that, even if neutrality were possible, it would not
be desirable, because no general principle of law can lead to justice in every
case.
163
It is difficult for an African-American knowledgeable of the history of her
people in the United States not to profess, at minimum, sympathy for legal
realism."6 Most blacks are aware of countless historical examples in which
African-Americans were not afforded the benefit of the rule of law: Think, for
example, of the existence of slavery in a republic purportedly dedicated to the
proposition that all men are created equal, or the law's support of state-
sponsored segregation even after the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed blacks
equal protection. That the rule of law ultimately corrected some of the large
holes in the American fabric is evidence more of its malleability than of its
virtue; the rule of law had, in the first instance, justified the holes. 65
The Supreme Court's decisions in the major "race" cases of the last term
underscore the continuing failure of the rule of law to protect African-
Americans through consistent application. Dissenting in a school desegregation
case, 66 four Justices stated that "[t]he Court's process of orderly adjudication
has broken down in this case."' 67 The dissent noted that the majority opinion
"effectively ... overrule[d] a unanimous constitutional precedent of 20 years
standing, which was not even addressed in argument, was mentioned merely
in passing by one of the parties, and discussed by another of them only in a
misleading way."'168 Similarly, in a voting rights case, 169 Justice Stevens,
162. See generally ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS (1975) (arguing that perceptions
of knowledge and reality are reciprocally dependant on political viewpoints).
163. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 23-24 (1931) (discussing
uncertainty of legal rules).
164. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROCESS 3-16 (1978) (describing discrimination by legal system against African-Americans throughout
American history and consequent skepticism towards equality of "rule of law").
165. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that racial segregation in public
transportation, mandated by legislation, does not violate Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment,
and rejecting argument that such racial separation treats African-Americans as inferior); Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-07 (1857) (declaring that slaves were not "citizens" within meaning
of Constitution because at time of framing of Constitution they had been "considered ... a subordinate and
inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not,
yet remained subject to their authority" and were "so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white
man was bound to respect").
166. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. CL 2038 (1995) (holding that district court order to attract
nonminority students to school district in furtherance of interdistrict goal was beyond scope of court's
authority).
167. Id. at 2073 (Souter, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 2074 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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in dissent, described the majority opinion as a "law-changing decision." 7'
And in an affirmative action case, 7' Justice Stevens began his dissent by
declaring that, "[i]nstead of deciding this case in accordance with controlling
precedent, the Court today delivers a disconcerting lecture about the evils of
governmental racial classifications."'72 At the end of his dissent, Stevens
argued that "the majority's concept of stare decisis ignores the force of binding
precedent."'
173
If the rule of law is a myth, or at least is not applicable to African-
Americans, the criticism that jury nullification undermines it loses force. The
black juror is simply another actor in the system, using her power to fashion
a particular outcome; the juror's act of nullification-like the act of the citizen
who dials 911 to report Ricky but not Bob, or the police officer who arrests
Lisa but not Mary, or the prosecutor who charges Kwame but not Brad, or the
judge who finds that Nancy was illegally entrapped but Verna was
not-exposes the indeterminacy of law, but does not create it.
3. The Moral Obligation to Disobey Unjust Laws
For the reader who is unwilling to concede the mythology of the rule of
law, I offer another response to the concern about violating it. Assuming, for
the purposes of argument, that the rule of law exists, there still is no moral
obligation to follow an unjust law. 74 This principle is familiar to many
African-Americans who practiced civil disobedience during the civil rights
protests of the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, Martin Luther King suggested that
169. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (affirming holding, in case brought by white
constituents claiming vote dilution, that Georgia's congressional redistricting plan violated Equal Protection
Clause, in part because of its allegedly racial rationale).
170. Id. at 2497 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (holding that racial classifications imposed
by government actors must withstand strict scrutiny).
172. Id. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 2131 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. The moral responsibility to obey the criminal law sometimes is premised on the duty of fair play.
Herbert Morris writes, for example:
[Ilt is just to punish those who have violated the rules and caused the unfair distribution of
benefits and burdens. A person who violates the rules has something others have-the benefits
of the system-but by renouncing what others have assumed, the burdens of self-restraint, he
has acquired an unfair advantage.
HERBERT MORRIS, Persons and Punishment, in ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 31, 34 (1976). What if, as racial critics argue, the African-American who
violates the rules does not have the benefits of the system? The logical inference is that punishment is
unjust. Related arguments may be made with regard to other theories of the obligation to obey. The "natural
duties" theory, in brief, suggests that there is a natural duty to support just institutions. See JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 114-17 (1971). Again, if the criminal law is unjust, there is no duty to support it.
Finally, the "social contract" theory assumes that people have, explicitly or implicitly, consented to obey
the law. See Kent Greenawalt, The Natural Duty to Obey the Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985). The
radical critic's response to social contract theory is that African-Americans were not consulted, explicitly
or implicitly. Cf. id. (arguing for "implausibility of claims of general consent").
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morality requires that unjust laws not be obeyed. 75 As I state above, 1 6 the
difficulty of determining which laws are unjust should not obscure the need to
make that determination.
Radical critics believe that the criminal law is unjust when applied to some
antisocial conduct by African-Americans: The law uses punishment to treat
social problems that are the result of racism and that should be addressed by
other means such as medical care or the redistribution of wealth. Later, I
suggest a utilitarian justification for why African-Americans should obey most
criminal law: It protects them. 177 I concede, however, that this limitation is
not morally required if one accepts the radical critique, which applies to all
criminal law.
4. Democratic Domination
Related to the "undermining the law" critique is the charge that jury
nullification is antidemocratic. The trial judge in the Barry case, for example,
in remarks made after the conclusion of the trial, expressed this criticism of the
jury's verdict: "'The jury is not a mini-democracy, or a mini-legislature ....
They are not to go back and do right as they see fit. That's anarchy. They are
supposed to follow the law.'"1 78 A jury that nullifies "betrays rather than
furthers the assumptions of viable democracy." In a sense, the argument
suggests that the jurors are not playing fair: The citizenry made the rules, so
the jurors, as citizens, ought to follow them.
What does "viable democracy" assume about the power of an unpopular
minority group to make the laws that affect them? It assumes that the group
has the power to influence legislation. The American majority-rule electoral
system is premised on the hope that the majority will not tyrannize the
minority, but rather represent the minority's interests. Indeed, in creating the
Constitution, the Framers attempted to guard against the oppression of the
minority by the majority.179 Unfortunately, these attempts were expressed
175. See MARTIN L. KING, JR., Letter From A Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 77, 84
(1964) ("[Olne has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with St. Augustine that 'an
unjust law is no law at all."'). In opposition to my views, however, King believed that one who breaks an
unjust law must do so "with a willingness to accept the penalty." Id. at 86. This view is also contrary to
the view of the morality of nullification in the historically approved cases; few people argue, for example,
that the runaway slaves should have been willing to accept the penalty when they broke unjust laws.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 155-58.
177. For a summary, and critique, of utilitarian justifications for obeying the law, see Greenawalt,
supra note 174, at 5-6.
178. Barton Gellman, Barry Judge's Remarks Break Judicial Norms, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1990, at
D1. D3.
179. In his celebrated discussion of the dangers of faction in The Federalist No. 10, James Madison
stated that, to prevent a majority faction from sacrificing the "public good and the rights of other citizens"
to "its own ruling passion," the existence of the passion must be prevented or the majority "must be
rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of
oppression." THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 80-81 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also
Alexander Hamilton, Debate of Monday, June 18, 1787, in 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
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more in theory than in actual constitutional guarantees, a point made by some
legal scholars, particularly critical race theorists.
The implication of the failure to protect blacks from the tyrannical
majority is that the majority rule of whites over African-Americans is, morally
speaking, illegitimate. Lani Guinier suggests that the moral legitimacy of
majority rule hinges on two assumptions: 1) that majorities are not fixed; and
2) that minorities will be able to become members of some majorities. 8 '
Racial prejudice "to such a degree that the majority consistently excludes the
minority, or refuses to inform itself about the relative merit of the minority's
preferences," defeats both assumptions. 181 Similarly, Owen Fiss has given
three reasons for the failure of blacks to prosper through American democracy:
They are a numerical minority, they have low economic status, and, "as a
'discrete and insular' minority, they are the object of 'prejudice'-that is, the
subject of fear, hatred, and distaste that make it particularly difficult for them
to form coalitions with others (such as the white poor).' 82
According to both theories, blacks are unable to achieve substantial
progress through regular electoral politics.' 8 3 Their only "democratic" route
to success-coalition building with similarly situated groups-is blocked
because other groups resist the stigma of the association. The stigma is
powerful enough to prevent alignment with African-Americans even when a
group-like low income whites-has similar interests.
In addition to individual white citizens, legislative bodies experience the
Negrophobia described above. Professor Guinier defines such legislative racism
as
a pattern of actions [that] persistently disadvantag[es] a fixed,
legislative minority and encompasses conscious exclusion as well as
marginalization that results from "a lack of interracial empathy." It
means that where a prejudiced majority rules, its representatives are
CONSTITUTION IN THE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 198, 203 (reprint, Ayer Co. 1987)
(Jonathan Elliot ed., New York 1888) ("Give all power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all
power to the few, they will oppress the many. Both, therefore, ought to have the power, that each may
defend itself against the other."). This concern was not limited to the Framers; John Stuart Mill, for
example, shared it. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 7 (Currin V. Shields ed., Liberal Arts Press 1956)
(1859) ("[Tlhe tyranny of the majority' is now generally included among the evils against which society
requires to be on its guard.").
180. See Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest For Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REv. 1413,
1479 (1991).
181. Id. at 1478-79.
182. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 152 (1976).
183. This is exemplified by the abject failure of the Congressional Black Caucus's effort to amend the
Crime Bill of 1994. See Derrick Z. Jackson, Equal Justice Takes A Loss, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 3, 1994,
at 15. The proposed change would have amended Part VI of Title 28 of the United States Code to prohibit
capital sentences from being imposed on the basis of race and to allow statistics regarding racial
discrimination to be introduced in death penalty cases. See H.R. 4017, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a) (1994).
Ironically, it was called the "Racial Justice Act." Id. § 1. This episode seems to demonstrate the inadequacy
of the argument that white legislators will adequately represent black interests.
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not compelled to identify its interests with those of the African-
American minority.'8"
Such racism excludes blacks from the governing legislative coalitions. A
permanent, homogeneous majority emerges, which effectively marginalizes
minority interests and "transform[s] majority rule into majority tyranny."'85
Derrick Bell calls this condition "democratic domination."'
186
Democratic domination undermines the basis of political stability, which
depends on the inducement of "losers to continue to play the political game,
to continue to work within the system rather than to try to overthrow it."' '87
Resistance by minorities to the operation of majority rule may take several
forms, including "overt compliance and secret rejection of the legitimacy of the
political order."'188 I suggest that another form of this resistance is racially
based jury nullification.
If African-Americans believe that democratic domination exists (and the
1994 congressional elections seem to provide compelling recent support for
such a belief"89), they should not back away from lawful self-help measures,
like jury nullification, on the ground that the self-help is antidemocratic. 9'
African-Americans are not a numerical majority in any of the fifty states,
which are the primary sources of criminal law.'9' In addition, they are not
even proportionally represented in the U.S. House of Representatives or in the
184. Guinier, supra note 180, at 1444-45.
185. Id. at 1479.
186. BELL, supra note 83, at 177.
187. Nicholas R. Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 734, 742 (1983).
188. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 97-98 (1956).
189. Among white men, 66% voted a straight Republican ticket during the 1994 congressional
elections. See Donald Lambro, GOP Eyes Extended Political Control, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1995, at A4.
Sixty percent of white female homemakers and nearly 50% of white working women did the same. Id.
Seventy-eight percent of white men, 68% of white working women, and 66% of white female homemakers
stated a desire for "more conservative policies and programs." Id.
190. The "betraying democracy" critique might be more persuasive when it is applied to groups, like
poor or "ethnic" whites, that have more influence over the law (because the stigma of coalition building
with African-Americans is not present), which is one reason why I believe that the justification for the type
of jury nullification I propose is rooted more in race subordination than class subordination. Some Marxists
argue, however, that criminal punishment is unfair when it occurs in a society characterized by extreme
social and class stratification. See, e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
217 (1973).
191. Even in the District of Columbia, where blacks are a majority, the U.S. Congress may veto any
local law passed by the city's elected representatives. One telling example of democratic domination
involved D.C.'s sodomy law. In the early 1980s, the locally elected city council repealed the law
criminalizing consensual sodomy. See Rene Sanchez, D.C. Sodomy Law Is Off the Books: Congress Allows
Repeal, Ending 12- Year Battle by Gay-Rights Advocates, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1993, at B3. In response,
Congress overturned the city council's action and reinstated sodomy as a crime. See id. In 1993, the city
council again repealed the law, but this time Congress allowed the local legislature's action to stand. See
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Senate. 192 As a result, African-Americans wield little influence over criminal
law, state or federal. African-Americans should embrace the antidemocratic
nature of jury nullification because it provides them with the power to
determine justice in a way that majority rule does not.
D. "[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice":193 The Symbolic
Function of Black Jurors
A second distinction one might draw between the traditionally approved
examples of jury nullification and its practice by contemporary African-
Americans is that, in the case of the former, jurors refused to apply a particular
law, e.g., a fugitive slave law, on the grounds that it was unfair, while in the
case of the latter, jurors are not so much judging discrete statutes as they are
refusing to apply those statutes to members of their own race. This application
of race consciousness by jurors may appear to be antithetical to the American
ideal of equality under the law.
This critique, however, like the "betraying democracy" critique, begs the
question of whether the ideal actually applies to African-Americans. As stated
above, racial critics answer this question in the negative.' 94 They, especially
the liberal critics, argue that the criminal law is applied in a discriminatory
fashion. 95 Furthermore, on several occasions, the Supreme Court has referred
to the usefulness of black jurors to the rule of law in the United States.196 In
essence, black jurors symbolize the fairness and impartiality of the law. Here
I examine this rhetoric and suggest that, if the presence of black jurors sends
a political message, it is right that these jurors use their power to control or
negate the meaning of that message.
As a result of the ugly history of discrimination against African-Americans
in the criminal justice system, 97 the Supreme Court has had numerous
opportunities to consider the significance of black jurors.' 98 In so doing, the
192. There are 39 blacks in the 104th Congress (38 in the House and 1 in the Senate), representing
approximately 7% of the Representatives and I% of the Senators, despite the fact that blacks make up
roughly 12% of the population. See Case of Amnesia for the High Court: Justices Seem to Forget History
and Reality of Race in America, L.A. TIMEs, July 2, 1995, at M4.
193. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
194. See supra Section II.A.
195. See, e.g., KING, supra note 175, at 86 (stating that "[slometimes a law is just on its face and
unjust in its application").
196. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that Equal Protection Clause forbids
prosecutor from challenging potential jurors based on their race); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1880) (holding that trying defendant before jury from which members of defendant's race were excluded
denies defendant equal protection of law).
197. See supra notes 96-109 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (holding that Equal Protection Clause forbids
defendant to exercise peremptory challenges based on race of potential jurors); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S.
474 (1990) (holding that white defendant has standing to raise Sixth Amendment challenge to prosecutor's
use of race as basis for dismissing black potential jurors); Batson, 476 U.S. 79; Strauder, 100 U.S. 303.
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Court has suggested that these jurors perform a symbolic function, especially
when they sit on cases involving African-American defendants, 99 and the
Court has typically made these suggestions in the form of rhetoric about the
social harm caused by the exclusion of blacks from jury service.2 0 I will
refer to this role of black jurors as the "legitimization function."
The legitimization function stems from every jury's political function of
providing American citizens with "the security ... that they, as jurors actual
or possible, being part of the judicial system of the country can prevent its
arbitrary use or abuse.' 20' In addition to, and perhaps more important than,
seeking the truth, the purpose of the jury system is "to impress upon the
criminal defendant and the community as a whole that a verdict of conviction
or acquittal is given in accordance with the law by persons who are fair."202
This purpose is consistent with the original purpose of the constitutional right
to a jury trial, which was "to prevent oppression by the Government.,
203
When blacks are excluded from juries, beyond any harm done to the juror
who suffers the discrimination or to the defendant, the social injury of the
exclusion is that it "undermine[s] ... public confidence-as well [it]
should.,,2 ' Because the United States is both a democracy and a pluralist
society, it is important that diverse groups appear to have a voice in the laws
that govern them. Allowing black people to serve on juries strengthens "public
respect for our criminal justice system and the rule of law.
2 5
The Supreme Court has found that the legitimization function is
particularly valuable in cases involving "race-related" crimes.20 6 According
to the Court, in these cases, "emotions in the affected community [are]
inevitably ... heated and volatile., 207 The potential presence of black people
on the jury in a "race-related" case calms the natives, which is especially
important in this type of case because "[p]ublic confidence in the integrity of
the criminal justice system is essential for preserving community peace.
' 203
The very fact that a black person can be on a jury is evidence that the criminal
199. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 ("The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond
that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community.").
200. The Court has openly acknowledged the significance of this rhetoric, even suggesting that it plays
a role in determining its holdings. For example, in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), the Court stated
that Batson "'was designed "to serve multiple ends,"' only one of which was to protect individual
defendants from discrimination in the selection of jurors .... Batson recognized that a prosecutor's
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges harms the excluded jurors and the community at large." Id.
at 406 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
201. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310 (1922).
202. Powers, 499 U.S. at 413.
203. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).
204. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 49 (1992).
205. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986).
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justice system is one in which black people should have confidence, and one
that they should respect.
But what of the black juror who endorses racial critiques of American
criminal justice? Such a person holds no "confidence in the integrity of the
criminal justice system." If she is cognizant of the implicit message that the
Supreme Court believes her presence sends, she might not want her presence
to be the vehicle for that message. Let us assume that there is a black
defendant who, the evidence suggests, is guilty of the crime with which he has
been charged, and a black juror who thinks that there are too many black men
in prison. The black juror has two choices: She can vote for conviction, thus
sending another black man to prison and implicitly allowing her presence to
support public confidence in the system that puts him there, or she can vote
"not guilty," thereby acquitting the defendant, or at least causing a mistrial. In
choosing the latter, the juror makes a decision not to be a passive symbol of
support for a system for which she has no respect. Rather than signaling her
displeasure with the system by breaching "community peace," the black juror
invokes the political nature of her role in the criminal justice system and votes
"no." In a sense, the black juror engages in an act of civil disobedience, except
that her choice is better than civil disobedience because it is lawful. 9 Is the
black juror's race-conscious act moral? Absolutely. It would be farcical for her
to be the sole color-blind actor in the criminal process, especially when it is
her blackness that advertises the system's fairness.1
At this point, every African-American should ask herself whether the
operation of the criminal law in the United States advances the interests of
black people. If it does not, the doctrine of jury nullification affords African-
American jurors the opportunity to control the authority of the law over some
African-American criminal defendants. In essence, black people can "opt out"
of American criminal law.
How far should they go? Completely to anarchy? Or is there some place
between here and there, safer than both? The next part describes such a place,
and how to get there.
209. I do not mean to imply that civil disobedience is "wrong" in some sense because it is illegal;
indeed, its criminality is one of its advantages, because the willingness of those practicing civil
disobedience to break a law and endure the consequences emphasizes the immorality of that law. I find it
troubling, however, that the power of white supremacy was such that, in order to end government-
sponsored segregation in the South, so many people-black and white-had to go to jail.
210. Although the legitimization function may be an inevitable consequence of black presence on
juries, my response is not that blacks should refuse to participate in juries, which would, for obvious
reasons, be counterproductive. I argue, instead, that the function provides additional moral justification for
nullification by black jurors: It is appropriate for blacks to control the meaning of the symbolism their
presence creates.
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I. A PROPOSAL FOR RACIALLY BASED JURY NULLIFICATION
To allow African-American jurors to exercise their responsibility in a
principled way, I make the following proposal: African-American jurors should
approach their work cognizant of its political nature and their prerogative to
exercise their power in the best interests of the black community. In every
case, the juror should be guided by her view of what is "just." For the reasons
stated in the preceding parts of this Essay, I have more faith in the average
black juror's idea of justice than I do in the idea that is embodied in the "rule
of law."
A. A Framework for Criminal Justice in the Black Community
In cases involving violent malum in se crimes like murder, rape, and
assault, jurors should consider the case strictly on the evidence presented, and,
if they have no reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, they should
convict. For nonviolent malum in se crimes such as theft or perjury,
nullification is an option that the juror should consider, although there should
be no presumption in favor of it. A juror might vote for acquittal, for example,
when a poor woman steals from Tiffany's, but not when the same woman
steals from her next-door neighbor. Finally, in cases involving nonviolent,
malum prohibitum offenses, including "victimless" crimes like narcotics
offenses, there should be a presumption in favor of nullification. "
This approach seeks to incorporate the most persuasive arguments of both
the racial critics and the law enforcement enthusiasts. If my model is faithfully
executed, the result would be that fewer black people would go to prison; to
that extent, the proposal ameliorates one of the most severe consequences of
211. For an excellent description of the folly of punishing victimless conduct, and for an argument
as to why drug offenses are victimless, see Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug Prohibition and the
Weakness of Public Policy, 103 YALE LJ. 2593, 2621-25 (1994) (reviewing STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT
C. GROSS, AMERICA's LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS (1993)).
Barnett defines victimless conduct "in terms of the 'harm principle': people should have the freedom to
act so long as they do not harm others. Given the inherent subjectivity of 'harm,' however, the concept of
victimless conduct cannot be taken to mean conduct with no adverse effects on others." Id. at 2621. While
some of the victimless criminal conduct my proposal tolerates may have an adverse effect on others, the
criminal law is not the correct way, or even an effective way, to address that adverse effect.
Perhaps my argument can be appreciated more clearly in a context outside of the heated rhetoric
surrounding illegal drugs. I am acutely aware, for example, of the social cost of the "victimless" conduct
of cigarette smoking, including the physical injury that second-hand tobacco smoke causes many innocent
victims. See Lidia Wasowicz, Second-hand Smoke Can Kill Infants, UPI, Mar. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, UPI File. Nonetheless, it would be misguided public policy to lock up cigarette smokers;
I prefer the policies of health care for curing smokers of their self-destructive conduct and education for
informing people of the danger that tobacco smoke poses. While incarceration might be a stronger deterrent
to tobacco smoking than is self-preservation (the design of health care) or social reprobation (one of the
designs of public education), I believe, on libertarian and utilitarian grounds, that use of the criminal law
would be unjust in this context. And since I endorse the radical racial critique, I also believe, here on moral
and utilitarian grounds, that the criminal law is the wrong way to treat other "victimless" conduct by
African-Americans.
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law enforcement in the African-American community.212 At the same time,
the proposal, by punishing violent offenses and certain others, preserves any
protection against harmful conduct that the law may offer potential victims. If
the experienced prosecutors at the U.S. Attorney's Office are correct, some
violent offenders currently receive the benefit of jury nullification, doubtless
from a misguided, if well-intentioned, attempt by racial critics to make a
political point. Under my proposal, violent lawbreakers would go to prison.
In the language of criminal law, the proposal adopts utilitarian
justifications for punishment: deterrence and isolation. To that extent, it accepts
the law enforcement enthusiasts' faith in the possibility that law can prevent
crime. The proposal does not, however, judge the lawbreakers as harshly as the
enthusiasts would judge them. Rather, the proposal assumes that, regardless of
the reasons for their antisocial conduct, people who are violent should be
separated from the community, for the sake of the nonviolent. The proposal's
justifications for the separation are that the community is protected from the
offender for the duration of the sentence and that the threat of punishment may
discourage future offenses and offenders. I am confident that balancing the
social costs and benefits of incarceration would not lead black jurors to release
violent criminals simply because of race.1 3 While I confess agnosticism
about whether the law can deter antisocial conduct, I am unwilling to
experiment by abandoning any punishment premised on deterrence.
Of the remaining traditional justifications for punishment, the proposal
eschews the retributive or 'just deserts" theory for two reasons. First, I am
persuaded by racial and other critiques of the unfairness of punishing people
for "negative" reactions to racist, oppressive conditions. In fact, I sympathize
with people who react "negatively" to the countless manifestations of white
supremacy that black people experience daily. While my proposal does not
"excuse" all antisocial conduct, it will not punish such conduct on the premise
that the intent to engage in it is "evil." The antisocial conduct is no more evil
than the conditions that cause it, and, accordingly, the "just deserts" of a black
offender are impossible to know. And even if just deserts were susceptible to
accurate measure, I would reject the idea of punishment for retribution's sake.
My argument here is that the consequences are too severe: African-
Americans cannot afford to lock up other African-Americans simply on
account of anger. There is too little bang for the buck. Black people have a
community that needs building, and children who need rescuing, and as long
as a person will not hurt anyone, the community needs him there to help.
212. Drug offenders, for example, makeup approximately 60% of those incarcerated in federal prisons.
See Criminal Ineptitude, ECONOMIST (London), Apr. 23, 1994, at A25.
213. See Gellman & Horwitz, supra note 8, at Al, A14 (describing then-Washington, D.C. Police
Chief Isaac Fulwood as "not[ing] that most D.C. defendants and jurors are black" and "that most trials lead
to conviction," and as saying that "'[t]he ovenvhelming majority of black people aren't going to turn
anybody away for the crime of murder"').
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Assuming that he actually will help is a gamble, but not a reckless one, for the
"just" African-American community will not leave the lawbreaker be: It will,
for example, encourage his education and provide his health care (including
narcotics dependency treatment) and, if necessary, sue him for child support.
In other words, the proposal demands of African-Americans responsible self-
help outside of the criminal courtroom as well as inside it.214 When the
214. For example, jurors who engage in nullification might be morally obligated to participate in black
self-help programs, such as those proposed by Louis Farrakhan at the Million Man March in Washington,
D.C. Farrakhan asked the hundreds of thousands of African-American men who participated in the march
to pledge to "adopt" a prison inmate, see Mark Johnson & Gil Klein, A March for Atonement: Farrakhan
Leads Pledge Against Violence Before Crowd of 400,000, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct. 17, 1995, at
Al, as well as to take personal responsibility for reducing drug use and violent crime in the African-
American community, see Jeff Barker & Adrianne Flynn, A "New Foundation"; 400,000 Black Men Hold
Peaceful Rally at Capitol, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 17, 1995, at Al.
In addition, the self-help I prescribe may include community enforcement of norms against antisocial
conduct. For example, the security force of the Nation of Islam has successfully reduced crime in some
public housing projects, including those where traditional law enforcement has not been effective. See
Vernon Loeb, D.C. Hires Nation of Islam Guards for SE Complex; Public Housing Chief Cites Patrols'
Success At Other Developments in Nation, WASH. POST, May 4, 1995, at Cl, C4 (describing Nation of
Islam patrols and quoting public housing "tenant leader" Jacqueline West: "'The residents really want the
Nation of Islam guards-they have good manners, they know how to talk to you. They don't need guns.
I like their approach."'). In fact, some observers attribute whatever influence Louis Farrakhan may wield
in the African-American community to the Nation of Islam's ability to rehabilitate black criminals and
protect black neighborhoods. See Charlise Lyles, Farrakhan to Address Anti-Violence Rally; The Muslim
Leader Will Discuss Black-on-Black Crime, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR, July 21, 1994, at B3
(describing Nation of Islam member's view that "Farrakhan's reputation among most blacks rests on his
success in rehabilitating black men from a life of crime and cleaning up crack-addled, crime-infested
communities from Los Angeles to Washington").
Many African-Americans are already engaged in efforts to prevent crime, as an alternative or
supplement to cooperation with law enforcement. See, e.g., Blacks Found Putting Focus on Self-Help, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 1994, at A18 (describing various black-led, anticrime programs, including gun buy-back
programs, meetings among street gang leaders to negotiate national truce, and mentoring programs);
Lourdes M. Leslie, "Our Young People Are Killing Each Other": Black Pastors Aim to Ignite War on
Youth Violence, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 20, 1994, at Al (describing black minister's efforts to prevent crime
by befriending black criminals and their goal of preventing crime by increasing opportunities for legal
employment); Jack Wardlaw, Black Caucus: Crime Fight Is Flawed; Preventive Steps Are Urged, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 23, 1994, at A24 (describing Legislative Black Caucus program for
reducing crime rate, including teaching nonviolent dispute resolution to students).
There is also evidence that minority groups in other societies have perceived the need for self-help
to combat antisocial conduct in their communities, and have not relied upon the majority for this protection.
In some Jewish communities, for example, "criminal" problems are supposed to be resolved within the
community, with the guidance of a rabbi and without resort to the criminal justice system of the larger
society in which the Jewish community exists. See 18.C THE TALMUD OF BABYLONIA 112 (Jacob Neusner
trans., 1992) (quoting Gittin 88B: "'R. Tarfon would say, "In any case in which you find gentile law courts,
even though their law is the same as Israelite law, you may not go to them, since [the Bible] says, 'These
are the judgments that you shall set before them,'-before them, not before gentiles."" (citation omitted)),
cited in Michael J. Broyde, Jewish Response, 16 LOy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 29, 32-33 & n.22 (1993)
(giving version of passage as part of Jewish response to duty to educate, in symposium on religious law)
and Izhak Englard, The Relationship Between Religion and State in Israel, in JEWISH LAw IN ANCIENT AND
MODERN ISRAEL 168, 176 n.33 (Haim H. Cohn ed., 1971). In one case, after a long period of inaction by
the local rabbi, a Jewish family complained to British police that their children were being abused by the
babysitter, a rabbinical student. See Nira Yuval-Davis, Jewish Fundamentalism and Women's
Empowerment, in REFUSING HOLY ORDERS: WOMEN AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN BRITAIN 198, 219 (1992).
The family members were subsequently "denounced as 'Moysers'-'informants'-and hounded out of their
home, and their children out of their school." Id. Of course, the Talmud goes further than my modest
proposal, which accepts the imposition of "outsider" (white) law in many cases. I am grateful to Courtney
W. Howland for informing me of these examples from the Jewish tradition.
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community is richer, perhaps then it can afford anger.
The final traditional justification for punishment, rehabilitation, can be
dealt with summarily. If rehabilitation were a meaningful option in American
criminal justice, I would not endorse nullification in any case. It would be
counterproductive, for utilitarian reasons: The community is better off with the
antisocial person cured than sick. Unfortunately, however, rehabilitation is no
longer an objective of criminal law in the United States,215 and prison
appears to have an antirehabilitative effect.216 For this reason, unless a juror
is provided with a specific, compelling reason to believe that a conviction
would result in some useful treatment for an offender, she should not use her
vote to achieve this end, because almost certainly it will not occur.
B. Hypothetical Cases
How would a juror decide individual cases under my proposal? For the
purposes of the following hypothesis, let us assume criminal prosecutions in
state or federal court and technically guilty African-American defendants. Easy
cases under my proposal include a defendant who possessed crack cocaine, and
a defendant who killed another person. The former should be acquitted, and
the latter should go to prison.
The crack cocaine case is simple: Because the crime is victimless, the
proposal presumes nullification. According to racial critiques, acquittal is just,
due in part to the longer sentences given for crack offenses than for powder
cocaine offenses.2 17 This case should be particularly compelling to the liberal
racial critic, given the extreme disparity between crack and powder in both
enforcement of the law and in actual sentencing. According to a recent study,
215. See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 155
(5th ed. 1989) ("[T]he rehabilitative ideal had great influence on American penology and corrections
policies. In recent years, however, its influence has gone into eclipse .... "); Robert Blecker, Haven or
Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of Punishment Justified, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1149
(1990) (discussing congressional rejection of rehabilitation as justification for punishment); Toni A.
Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1890-95 (1991)
(describing and analyzing decline of rehabilitation and rise of retribution as justifications for punishment);
Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1012-13 (1991) (discussing
widespread rejection of rehabilitation as justification for punishment by those involved in criminal justice
system); cf. J. Gordon Seymour, Downward Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Based on
the Defendant's Drug Rehabilitative Efforts, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 837, 841 (1992) (noting refusal of some
courts to allow departures from Federal Sentencing Guidelines based on defendant's postoffense drug
rehabilitation).
216. See Stephen D. Sowle, A Regime of Social Death: Criminal Punishment in the Age of Prisons,
21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 497, 500 (1994-95) ("The end result is that imprisonment, even when
it is being used for putatively rehabilitative ends, actually incites and encourages the very forms of criminal
behavior it professes to condemn and punish.").
There is a rich tradition of literature by African-Americans detailing the destruction to the human
psyche that incarceration can cause. See, e.g., ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE (1968); GEORGE JACKSON,
SOLEDAD BROTHER: THE PRISON LETTERS OF GEORGE JACKSON (1970); MCCALL, supra note 120;
WALKER, supra note 120; MALCOLM X & ALEX HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (1964).
217. See supra note 103.
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African-Americans make up 13% of the nation's regular drug users, but they
account for 35% of narcotics arrests, 55% of drug convictions, and 74% of
those receiving prison sentences.21 Most of the people who are arrested for
crack cocaine offenses are black; most arrested for powder cocaine are
white.219 Under federal law, if someone possesses fifty grams of crack
cocaine, the mandatory-minimum sentence is ten years; in order to receive the
same sentence for powder cocaine, the defendant must possess 5000
grams.220 Given the racial consequences of this disparity, I hope that many
racial critics will nullify without hesitation in these cases.
The case of the murderer is "easy" solely for the utilitarian reasons I
discussed above. Although I do not believe that prison will serve any
rehabilitative function for the murderer, there is a possibility that a guilty
verdict will prevent another person from becoming a victim, and the juror
should err on the side of that possibility. In effect, I "write off" the black
person who takes a life, not for retributive reasons, but because the black
community cannot afford the risks of leaving this person in its midst.
Accordingly, for the sake of potential victims (given the possibility that the
criminal law deters homicide), nullification is not morally justifiable here.
Difficult hypothetical cases include the ghetto drug dealer and the thief
who burglarizes the home of a rich family. Under the proposal, nullification
is presumed in the first case because drug distribution is a nonviolent, malum
prohibitum offense. Is nullification morally justifiable here? It depends. There
is no question that encouraging people to engage in self-destructive behavior
is evil; the question the juror should ask herself is whether the remedy is less
evil. I suspect that the usual answer would be "yes," premised on deterrence
and isolation theories of punishment. Accordingly, the drug dealer would be
convicted. The answer might change, however, depending on the particular
facts of the case: the type of narcotic sold, the ages of the buyers, whether the
dealer "marketed" the drugs to customers or whether they sought him out,
whether it is a first offense, whether there is reason to believe that the drug
dealer would cease this conduct if given another chance, and whether, as in the
crack case, there are racial disparities in sentencing for this kind of crime. I
218. See Pierre Thomas, I in 3 Young Black Men in Justice System; Criminal Sentencing Policies
Cited in Study, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1995, at Al (describing study). This discrepancy has been noted by
President Clinton, who, in a recent speech, referred to the finding that one in three African-American men
is under criminal justice supervision and said that 'that is a disproportionate percentage in comparison to
the percentage of blacks who use drugs in our society."' Rift Between Blacks, Whites "Is Tearing at the
Heart of America," WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1995, at A13 (excerpting speech by President on race relations).
To my mind, the President then indicated a rudimentary sympathy for my proposal when he stated that '"I
would like every white person here and in America to take a moment to think how he or she would feel
if one in three white men were in similar circumstances."' Id.
219. See Kevin Johnson, Rioting Inmates Locked Away; Violence Follows Cocaine-Law Vote, USA
TODAY, Oct. 23, 1995, at 2A (stating that African-Americans make up 92% of crack defendants, but only
27% of powder cocaine defendants).
220. See id.; see also supra note 103.
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recognize that, in this hypothetical, nullification carries some societal risk. The
risk, however, is less consequential than with violent crimes. Furthermore, the
cost to the community of imprisoning all drug dealers is great. I would allow
the juror in this case more discretion.
The juror should also remember that many ghetto "drug" dealers are not
African-American 22t and that the state does not punish these dealers-
instead, it licenses them. Liquor stores are ubiquitous on the ghetto streets of
America.22 By almost every measure, alcoholism causes great injury to
society,2 and yet the state does not use the criminal law to address this
severe social problem. When the government tried to treat the problem of
alcohol use with criminal law, during Prohibition, a violent "black" market
formed.2 4 Even if the juror does not believe that drug dealing is a
"victimless" crime, she might question why it is that of all drug dealers, many
of the black capitalists are imprisoned, and many of the non-black capitalists
are legally enriched. When the juror remembers that the cost to the community
of having so many young men in jail means that law enforcement also is not
"victimless," the juror's calculus of justice might lead her to vote for acquittal.
As for the burglar who steals from the rich family, the case is troubling,
first of all, because the conduct is so clearly "wrong." As a nonviolent nzalum
in se crime, there is no presumption in favor of nullification, though it remains
an option. Here, again, the facts of the case are relevant to the juror's decision
of what outcome is fair. For example, if the offense was committed to support
a drug habit, I think there is a moral case to be made for nullification, at least
until drug rehabilitation services are available to all.
If the burglary victim is a rich white person, the hypothetical is troubling
for the additional reason that it demonstrates how a black juror's sense of
justice might, in some cases, lead her to treat defendants differently based on
the class and race of their victims. I expect that this distinction would occur
most often in property offenses because, under the proposal, no violent
221. See, e.g., Susan Moffat, Shopkeepers Fight Back: Blacks Join With Koreans in a Battle to Rebuild
Their Liquor Stores, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 1992, at DI, D3 (stating that, in Los Angeles, blacks own only
a minority of liquor stores in black areas).
222. See, e.g., Courtland Milloy, Message In the Bottle Is Despair, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1993, at
BI (reporting that, before riots of 1992, there were 700 liquor stores in black neighborhood of South
Central Los Angeles); Yolanda Woodlee, D.C. Agrees to Curtail Liquor; Council to Impose License
Moratorium in Four City Wards, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1994, at A] (reporting that Washington, D.C. city
council is limiting new liquor licenses because "alcohol is destroying black communities" and quoting city
council member Bill Lightfoot stating that "'[bilack people are killing themselves with alcohol').
223. See Kurt L. Schmoke, An Argument in Favor of Decriminalization, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 501,
521-22 (1990). Schmoke notes that alcohol plays a part in approximately 25,000 automobile fatalities
annually, see id. at 521 & n.120, that 50% of all homicides in 1980 (approximately 12,000) were
attributable to alcohol use, see id. at 521 n.123, and that it is estimated that, in 1983, alcohol abuse cost
the United States almost $117 billion in lost employment, reduced productivity, and health care payments,
see id. at 522 n.125.
224. See id. at 522-23 & nn.131-35.
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offenders would be excused.2" In an ideal world, whether the victim is rich
or poor or black or white would be irrelevant to adjudication of the defendant's
culpability. In the United States, my sense is that some black jurors will
believe that these factors are relevant to the calculus of justice. The rationale
is implicitly premised on a critique of the legitimacy of property rights in a
society marked by gross economic inequities.z 6 While I endorse this critique,
225. Some commentators predicted that an acquittal in the O.J. Simpson case would be evidence of
racially based jury nullification, see Robert Wright, Tyson v. Simpson, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 17, 1995, at
4, 49 ("The most legitimately dispiriting thing about an acquittal [in the Simpson case] would be the
spectacle of a mostly black jury failing to condemn a plainly guilty black man-more grim testament to
the widening gulf between white and black America."), and others have argued, since the verdict, that this
is, in fact, what happened, see, e.g., Jacob Weisberg, The Truth Card, NEW YORK, Oct. 16, 1995, at 33,
33 (stating that it was "obvious to even the most casual of observers" that "Simpson was a brutal murderer
going free, that the jury had been a terrible failure, and that there was some kind of sick moral inversion
about African-Americans celebrating his acquittal as a victory"). While this Essay makes an argument for
racially based jury nullification, reasonable doubt-the other legal justification for acquittal-may be
racially based as well. What is reasonable to an African-American may not be reasonable to a white person.
In the Simpson case, for example, police detective Mark Fuhrman claimed that he discovered an
extremely incriminating item of evidence-a bloody glove-near Simpson's house. See William Claibome,
Issue of Racism Emerges at O.J. Simpson Hearing; Admissibility of Detective's Remarks Argued, WASH.
POST, Jan. 14, 1995, at A3. The defense introduced evidence that, in the past, this police officer had used
racial epithets, including the word "nigger," and had admitted planting evidence in other cases. See William
Claibome & Lorraine Adams, Ito Recuses Himself on Tapes Ruling; Detective in Simpson Case Disparaged
Judge's Wife in Interview, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1995, at Al. The response of the prosecution and many
commentators was that the defense, in using this evidence to impeach the witness, was "playing the race
card," i.e., injecting irrelevant racial issues into the trial. See id. (quoting Marcia Clark, chief prosecutor
in Simpson case, as saying that defense was 'playing the race card'); Mary McGrory, Views From the
Jury Box, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1995, at A2 ("Playing the race card is always unconscionable, but doing
it in a double murder trial is a disgrace, even if inept prosecutors have handed it to you in the person of
the odious Fuhrman .... ). Many African-Americans, in contrast, may have been persuaded that either
the officer's testimony itself or the fact that the prosecution sponsored the testimony of a racist witness
created reasonable doubt about Simpson's guilt, even though the prosecution also presented circumstantial
evidence from other sources. Therefore, the black jurors' decision to acquit would have been based on a
faithful application of the law to the facts; they reasonably would have doubted the government's proof of
the defendant's guilt, as incredible as that seemed to many non-blacks (although it was obviously not
incredible to the two whites and one Hispanic on the jury, all of whom joined in the unanimous verdict of
acquittal). See Paul Butler, O.J. Reckoning: Rage for a New Justice, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1995, at Cl, C2
(explaining why Simpson verdict probably was based on reasonable doubt as opposed to jury nullification).
In the recent line of cases prohibiting the consideration of race in the exercise of peremptory
challenges, the Supreme Court has ignored the different ways in which black and non-black jurors might
perceive evidence. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). These cases are troubling because
the Court exhibits the same willful blindness to the significance of race that the D.C. Circuit exhibited in
United States v. Barry, Nos. 90-3149, 90-3150, & 90-3151, 1990 WL 104925 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1990), see
supra Subsection I.C.I.
I have explained that the liberal critique reflects the view that the criminal justice system is racist
because many of its actors are prejudiced, see supra Subsection II.A.1; accordingly, liberal critics are more
likely to find racially based reasonable doubt than others, including radical critics, who attribute racial
problems in criminal justice mainly to factors other than discrimination by law enforcers.
226. This critique is evidenced, for example, in the view of some blacks that taking property that does
not belong to them is a way to speak out against the status quo. See, e.g., Dwight L. Greene, Naughty by
Nurture: Black Male Joyriding-Is Everything Gonna Be Alright?, 4 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 73, 75,
84-95 (1994) (arguing that, for some young black men, stealing cars for joyrides can be form of social
protest). It can also be seen in a question often asked by black people upon hearing about the all-too-
familiar scenario of a poor black person being the victim of a property crime perpetrated by another black
person: "Why don't those [black perpetrators] go to [insert the name of the local rich white neighborhood]
to commit those crimes? Why do they take from people who don't have anything?" That this question does
not seem to be asked in the context of a violent crime (i.e., "Why didn't that black murderer kill a white
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I would encourage nullification here only in extreme cases (i.e., nonviolent
theft from the very wealthy) and mainly for political reasons: If the rich cannot
rely on criminal law for the protection of their property and the law prevents
more direct self-help measures, perhaps they will focus on correcting the
conditions that make others want to steal from them. This view may be naive,
but arguably no more so than that of the black people who thought that if they
refused to ride the bus, they could end legally enforced segregation in the
South.
C. Some Political and Procedural Concerns
1. What if White People Start Nullifying Too?
One concern is that whites will nullify in cases of white-on-black crime.
The best response to this concern is that often white people do nullify in those
cases. The white jurors who acquitted the police officers who beat up Rodney
King are a good example. 227 There is no reason why my proposal should
cause white jurors to acquit white defendants who are guilty of violence
against blacks any more frequently. My model assumes that black violence
against whites would be punished by black jurors; I hope that white jurors
would do the same in cases involving white defendants.
If white jurors were to begin applying my proposal to cases with white
defendants, then they, like the black jurors, would be choosing to opt out of
the criminal justice system. For pragmatic political purposes, that would be
excellent. Attention would then be focused on alternative methods of correcting
antisocial conduct much sooner than it would if only African-Americans raised
the issue.
person?") strengthens my supposition that it is based on a theory of property rights as opposed to mere
racial prejudice.
227. The current Solicitor General Drew Days remarked on such cases while testifying before
Congress on Justice Department efforts to prosecute police brutality:
[E]ven in those cases where we had strong evidence, and where we had a right to actually
obtain prosecution, we ran into jury nullification. Jurors simply would not convict police
officers. And we had to deal with the fact that most of the victims of police misconduct are
people who come from the wrong side of the tracks, if you will .... [including] racial
minorities.
Police Brutality: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Const. Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 172 (1991), quoted in Paul Hoffman, Double Jeopardy Wars: The Case
for a Civil Rights "Exception", 41 UCLA L. REV. 649, 668 (1994).
On the question of reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds, there was an important difference between
the evidence in the "Rodney King" case (Why is that case known by the name of the victim? Who were
the white defendants? Why don't many of us remember their names?) and the Simpson case (which I guess,
to be consistent, we should call the "Ronald Goldman and Nicole Simpson" case). The evidence in the
"Stacey Koon et al." case included a videotape of the crime, while the evidence in the Simpson case was
entirely circumstantial and was tainted by the involvement of a racist police officer. Based on my
experience as a prosecutor, I would say that the difference in the evidence in those cases was significant.
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2. How Do You Control Anarchy?
Why would a juror who is willing to ignore a law created through the
democratic process be inclined to follow my proposal? There is no guarantee
that she would. But when we consider that black jurors are already nullifying
on the basis of race because they do not want to send another black man to
prison, we recognize that these jurors are willing to use their power in a
politically conscious manner. Many black people have concerns about their
participation in the criminal justice system as jurors and might be willing to
engage in some organized political conduct, not unlike the civil disobedience
that African-Americans practiced in the South in the 1950s and 1960s. It
appears that some black jurors now excuse some conduct-like murder-that
they should not excuse. My proposal, however, provides a principled structure
for the exercise of the black juror's vote. I am not encouraging anarchy.
Instead, I am reminding black jurors of their privilege to serve a higher calling
than law: justice. I am suggesting a framework for what justice means in the
African-American community.
3. How Do You Implement the Proposal?
Because Sparf as well as the law of many states, prohibits jurors from
being instructed about jury nullification in criminal cases,228 information
about this privilege would have to be communicated to black jurors before they
heard such cases. In addition, jurors would need to be familiar with my
proposal's framework for analyzing whether nullification is appropriate in a
particular case. Disseminating this information should not be difficult. African-
American culture-through mediums such as church, music (particularly rap
songs), black newspapers and magazines, literature, storytelling, film (including
music videos), soapbox speeches, and convention gatherings-facilitates
intraracial communication. At African-American cultural events, such as
concerts or theatrical productions, the audience could be instructed on the
proposal, either verbally or through the dissemination of written material; this
type of political expression at a cultural event would hardly be unique-voter
registration campaigns are often conducted at such events.229 The proposal
could be the subject of rap songs, which are already popular vehicles for racial
critiques, 23 or of ministers' sermons.23'
228. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Geoff Brown, "Hey; Baby, Won't You Be My Dog and I'll Be Your Tree." George
Clinton Talks Dirty to GeoffBrown, INDEPENDENT, July 14, 1995, at II (stating that black "funk" musician
George Clinton encourages voter registration at his concerts).
230. See Kennedy, supra note 83, at 1258 n.10 (noting advocacy of racial critiques of criminal justice
by rap musicians).
231. In a Christian church, the sermon might be based on the book of Isaiah: "The Spirit of the Lord
God is upon me; because the Lord hath anointed me to preach good tidings unto the meek; he hath sent
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One can also imagine more direct approaches. For example, advocates of
this proposal232 might stand outside a courthouse and distribute flyers
explaining the proposal to prospective jurors. z 3 During deliberations, those
jurors could then explain to other jurors their prerogative-their power-to
decide justice rather than simply the facts. Sparf is one Supreme Court
decision whose holding is rather easy to circumvent: If the defense attorneys
cannot inform the people of their power, the people can inform themselves.
And once informed, the people would have a formula for what justice means
in the African-American community, rather than having to decide it on an ad
hoc basis.234
I hope that all African-American jurors will follow my proposal, and I am
encouraged by the success of other grass-roots campaigns, like the famous
Montgomery bus boycott, aimed at eliminating racial oppression. 35 I note,
however, that even with limited participation by African-Americans, my
proposal could have a significant impact. In most American jurisdictions, jury
verdicts in criminal cases must be unanimous. One juror could prevent the
conviction of a defendant. The prosecution would then have to retry the case,
and risk facing another African-American juror with emancipation
tendencies. 36 I hope that there are enough of us out there, fed up with prison
me... to proclaim liberty to the captives, and the opening of the prison to them that are bound ......
Isaiah 61:1.
232. Such advocates might include members of Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM), a
group founded to combat the harsh consequences of mandatory-minimum sentences for certain crimes. See
Johnson, supra note 219, at 2A (describing rioting at federal prisons in response to failure of Congress to
equalize sentences for powder cocaine and crack cocaine offenses, and noting position of president of
FAMM that rioting was predictable based on unfairness of sentencing disparity).
233. Anti-abortion activists have used similar tactics to encourage jury nullification in trials of people
who engaged in civil disobedience at abortion and family-planning clinics. In one set of cases, in San
Diego, one defendant was the publisher of a local newspaper, and, as the trials began, the paper ran an
advertisement informing current and potential jurors that "'You Can Legally Acquit Anti-Abortion
"Trespassers" Even If They're "guilty."". Alan W. Scheflin & Jon M. Van Dyke, Merciful Juries: The
Resilience of Jury Nullification, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 165, 180 (1991), quoted in ABRAMSON, supra
note 121, at 57. The ad stated that the jurors would be told that they were not allowed to nullify, but that
it would be 'unjust and illegal"' for the judge and prosecutor to deny them that right. Michael Granberry,
Abortion Protest Juries Told to Ignore Nullification Ad, L.A. TIMES (San Diego County ed.), Jan. 27, 1990,
at BI, quoted in ABRAMSON, supra note 121, at 58.
234. I am aware that, at present, my formula is simply one African-American man's view of what
justice means, and I am entirely amenable to a more democratic reshaping of that idea, perhaps by some
representative organization of African-Americans. I would not be troubled if my proposal were limited in
some way, such as by restricting nullification to cases of drug possession, as opposed to drug distribution.
235. The Montgomery bus boycott was sparked by the arrest of Rosa Parks, who refused to give up
her seat on a public bus to a white person, in violation of the Montgomery, Alabama segregation statute.
The subsequent boycott of the buses caused significant hardship for its African-American participants,
including the loss of employment, physical violence, and the inconvenience of having to walk to work
every day for more than a year. See generally Walt Harrington, "A Person Who Wanted To Be Free" (pt.
2), WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1995, Magazine, at Wl0, W24 (providing biographical account of Rosa Parks in
context of civil rights movement).
236. Prosecutors probably would try to identify jurors likely to nullify through voir dire; if those jurors
could be identified, they probably would be excused, through challenges for cause or peremptory
challenges. The African-American juror facing this situation would be placed in the difficult position of
having to choose between revealing her racial sympathy, and thus surrendering her power, or denying her
racial sympathy, and thus committing perjury. Yet the legal and moral case for jury nullification might lead
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as the answer to black desperation and white supremacy, to cause retrial after
retrial, until, finally, the United States "retries" its idea of justice.
CONCLUSION
This Essay's proposal raises other concerns, such as the problem of
providing jurors with information relevant to their decision within the
restrictive evidentiary confines of a trial. Some of these issues can be resolved
through creative lawyeringY. Other policy questions are not as easily
answered, including the issue of how long (years, decades, centuries?) black
jurors would need to pursue racially based jury nullification. I think this
concern is related to the issue of the appropriate time span of other race-
conscious remedies, including affirmative action. Perhaps, when policymakers
acknowledge that race matters in criminal justice, the criminal law can benefit
from the successes and failures of race consciousness in other areas of the law.
I fear, however, that this day of acknowledgement will be long in coming.
Until then, I expect that many black jurors will perceive the necessity of
employing the self-help measures prescribed here.
I concede that the justice my proposal achieves is rough because it is as
susceptible to human foibles as the jury system. I am sufficiently optimistic to
hope that my proposal will be only an intermediate plan, a stopping point
between the status quo and real justice. I hope that this Essay will encourage
African-Americans to use responsibly the power they already have. To get
criminal justice past the middle point, I hope that the Essay will facilitate a
dialogue among all Americans in which the significance of race will not be
dismissed or feared, but addressed. The most dangerous "forbidden" message
is that it is better to ignore the truth than to face it.
the juror to believe that her perjury would be morally justifiable. As a former prosecutor, it is difficult for
me to encourage any juror to violate her oath. As an African-American, however, it is also difficult for me
to encourage my people to relinquish the greatest power they have against the tyranny of the majority.
Ultimately, it must be an individual decision.
For me, the issue of whether a lie under oath is ever justifiable is most clear when I ponder what my
reaction would be if I were being considered for a jury that had the power to sentence a defendant to death.
The Supreme Court has ruled that people opposed to the death penalty may be challenged by the
prosecution from sitting as jurors in capital cases. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). I
believe with all my heart that capital punishment is morally wrong, and I would have no compunction about
lying about this belief during voir dire if my lie could prevent the government from killing a human being.
237. In the Barry case, for example, Barry and his attorney essentially put the govemment's conduct
in setting up the "sting" operation on trial. See Hedges, supra note 19, at Al, B5; McGrory, supra note
19, at A2. Barry himself spoke at various rallies, condemning his trial as being dominated by racism. See
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